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Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings. LLC, ("Residential") by and 
through its counsel of record, Hmvley Troxell Ennis & I-lawley LLP, respectfully files this Reply 
i'vlemorandum in Support of l\'lotion in Limine. 
1. 
ARGUME:\fT 
Residential's Motion in Limine to pennit evidence in the trial conceming the validity of 
ParkWest Homes, LLC's ("ParkWest") mechanic's lien (the "Lien") does not implicate the "Imv 
of the case" doctrine because 0) many lien-validity issues have not been fully decided in the 
previous appeal and (ii) Residential or Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Services, 
Inc. ("MERS") could not have raised the lien-validity issues in the earlier appeal. The law oftbe 
case doctrine does, hm;vever, bar ParkWest from basing the amount of its Lien on the void and 
illegal contract between Julie Bamson ("Bamson") and ParkWest (the "Contract"). 
A. The Law Of The Case Doctrine Does Not Bar Residential From Arguing Lien 
Validity Issues That Have Not Been Before The Court Previously. 
In ParkWest Homes LLC F. Bamson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), the Supreme 
C01ll1 did not finally decide all lien-validity issues. Indeed, there simply is no colorable argument 
that the Supreme Court decided issues conceming the validity of the Lien outside the context of 
the verification and statement of demand requirements of Idaho Code sections 45-507(3)(a) and 
45-507(4) and the ldaho Contractor Registration Act. 
Park West argues in opposition that "the 'law a/the case' docrrine does prevent future 
htigation of all lien-validity issues that could have been raised in the earlier appeal." See 
ParkWest's Memorandum in Opposition at 5. This argument is a misinterpretation of the "law' of 
the case" doctrine. As noted in Residential's Memorandum in Support of Mation in Limine, the 
"Jaw of the case" doctrine "prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that 
REPLY MElvl0RANDU}\:1 IN SUPPORT OF MOTJON IN LHvHNE - 2 
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might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appea!." Taylor v.l'v1aile, 146 Idaho 705, 709. 
201 PJd 1282, 1286 (2009) (emphasis added). ParkWest's argument that the "law of the case" 
doctrine prohibits litigation of all issues that theoretically could have been asserted prior to the 
first appeal should be rejected for five reasons. 
First, it was procedurally impossible for Iv'lERS to argue extraneous lien-validity issues in 
the earlier appeal. In its summary judgment motion to this Court, MERS argued successfully that 
(i) ParkWest did not comply with Idaho Code sections 45-507(3)(a) and 45-507(4) and Oi) 
Park\Vest did not comply with the Idaho Contractor Registration Act. After ParkWest appealed 
this Court's summary judgment decision to the Idaho Supreme COUJ1, MERS had no ability to 
raise extraneOllS lien issues, as those issues were never before this Court 011 summary judgment. 
Consequently, those issues could not have been raised in the earlier appeal, and therefore, the 
"law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable in this context. 
Second, because MERS was not the appellant before the Supreme COUli, there were no 
"alleged en'ors" that it might have raised on appeal. Indeed, it would be illogical to require 
MERS to argue that this Court "erred" on lien-validity issues that this Comt never examined. 
Third, the "law of the case" doctrine does not apply to the respondent in the first appeal. 
See Hawley v. Green, 124 Idaho 385, 860 P.2d 1 (CL App. 1993). In its Memorandum in 
Opposition, ParkWesi argues that the case of Bouten Construction Co, v. HF. A1agnuson Co., 
133 Idaho 756,992 P.2d 751 (1999) "expressly holds that a respondent in a prior appeal cannot 
raise issues that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeaL" See Memorandum in 
Opposition at 7. (n Bouten, plaintiff-Bouten brought an action against defendant-Magnuson to 
collect the amount of the excess in the "Guaranteed Maximum Price" (the "GMP") that was 
attributable to the changes in the pJans made periodically by Magnuson during the construction 
REPL Y MElvI0Rl\NDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN UMINE - 3 
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ofa hoteL Id. at 759, 992 P.2d at 754. After a full trial on the merits, the district comi held that 
l'v[agnuson had not waived the GMP argument. Ie!. Bouten appealed, and the Idaho COUlt of 
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Magnuson was liable for the additional costs of 
changes above the GMP.ld. at 760, 992 P.2d at 755. On remand, without hearing new evidence, 
the district court awarded Bouten nearly $300,OOO.1d. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
Magnuson argued for the first time on appeal "that the contract with Bouten provided that any 
savings in the subcontractors' bids over the GMP \vas to be passed on to l'v1agnuson." Id. at 762, 
992 P.2d at 757. The Supreme Court refused to hear the argument, holding that Magnuson did 
not raise the issue at trial. 1£1. 
Bouten is distinguishable because the Idaho Supreme Court only came to its holding after 
the district court held a full trial on the merits. Indeed, if Magnuson wished to raise the issue, he 
had every opportunity to do so below. In this case, MERS did not have, and Residential has not 
had, an opportunity to litigate the extraneous lien-validity issues, as there has not yet been a full 
trial on the merits in which MERS or Residential would be required to advance all available 
arguments. 
Fourth, Residential is a new party to this lawsuit, having intervened after this case \vas 
remanded by the Supreme Court. Residential was not a party to the proceedings before this 
Court prior to the appeal, nor was it a party to the appeal. Residential has the right to raise issues 
that MERS did not raise previously. 
Fifth, and most impOltantly, if this Court \vere to accept ParkWest's reasoning, it would 
etTectively be adopting the position that a party bringing a motion for summary judgment rnUSl 
raise eve;y conceivable issue in fear of application of the "law of the case" doctrine tollo'wing an 
unsuccessful appeal--a position that would destroy the efficiency advantages and economical 
REPLYMEMORp.NDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOnON IN LIMINE - 4 
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value of summary judgment motions. Such a result should be rejected by this Comi, and 
Residential should not be barred from raising additional issues related to the validity of 
ParkWest's Lien. 
B. The Law Of The Case Doctrine Bars Park\Vest From Basing The Amount Of Its 
Lien On The Contract. 
This Court should also bar ParkWest from using the void and il1egal Contract as a basis 
for establishing the amount of its Lien. The Idaho Supreme Court unequivocally confinned that 
the Contract between Bamson and ParkWest is void and illegal, Parkwest, 149 Idaho at 608, 238 
P.3d at 203 (,'ParkWest does not challenge the district court's holding that the construction 
contract was void."), and held that ParkWest has a lien only "for \\1ork or labor [ParkWest] 
provided and materials it supplied." Id. Such work or labor cannot include any protlt to 
ParkWest that may have been built into the void and illegal Contract. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously ruled that a subcontractor who did not cQntract 
\vith a property owner has a lien claim only for the amount of the reasonable value of the service 
rendered or the materials provided under a quantum meruit theory: 
We do not believe that T & J [the subcontractors] have a basis for 
recovery against O.K. [the lando'W'TIer] under a quantum meruit 
theory. The general rule in this area is that a subcontractor who 
fUl111shes material or labor pursuant to an agreement with, or upon 
the order and credit of a general contractor cannot recover against 
the property owner upon the basis of an implied promise to pay 
arising from the owner's receipt and acceptance oftbe benefit of 
the material and labor furnished. Thus it is said that a landowner 
will not be held liable for \vork or material furnished by a 
subcontractor to a contractor, pursuant to a contractual 
anangement between the contractor and subcontractor, where the 
landowner is not a party to this contractual arrangement. 
REPL Y MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN UMINE - 5 
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It is true that there is an exception to this general rule under the 
mechanic's lien laws. where if a subcontractor is not paid. he may 
enforce his claim for compensation directly against the landowner. 
Great Plains Equl~')nJel1t, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline, 132 Idaho 754, 768, 979 P.2d 627,641 
Page 7 
(1999) (emphasis added) (citing Dale's Service Co., Inc. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 666-67, 534 
P.2d 1102, t 106--07 (1975)). Under the mechanic's lien laws, the Supreme Court held: 
In cases where one party has accepted valuable services under 
circumstances where he ought to pay, courts have implied a 
promise to pay and allowed recovery for the reasonable value of 
the services. That reasoning is applicable to situations involving an 
attempt by a workman to recover for his services by the lien 
procedure. 
Weber v. Eastern Idaho Packing Corporation, 94 Idaho 694,697,496 P.2d 693, 696 (1972). 
This reasoning should be applied here: because ParkWest has no contract with Residential, the 
Lien should be evaluated according to a quantum meruit theory, or "the reasonable value of the 
services rendered or the materials provided." Great Plains Equipment, 132 Idaho at 767, 979 . 
P.2d at 640. Such a ruling would comport with the Supreme Comi's language in this case that 
the amount of the Lien should be measured by the reasonable value of the "wo'rk or labor ... 
provided and materials ... supplied" by Park\Vest, independent of the void and illegal Contract. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Residential respectfully requests that this Court grant the 
Motion in Limine. 
REPLY MEMORANDUr.;f iN SUPPORT OF MOTJON IN LIMINE - 6 
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DATED THIS \1Y-day ofJanuary, 2011. 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
lv) /// 
By 1 / 
Ryantr. Me 1rland, ISB No. 7347 
Attm/ney or Defendant/Counterclaimant 
Resitlc ial Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERV[CE 
IJt 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this IV day of January, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Robert B. Bums 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS. CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, LD 83701 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney at Law 
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701-0837 
[Attorney for Defendant Julie G. Bamson] 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
~ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
~ Telecopy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
) 
PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho ) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
JULIE BARNSON, MORTGAGE ) 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION ) 
SYSTEMS, INC, ) 
) 
Defendants, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ) 
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware ) 
Limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Intervenor. ) 
--------------------------) 
Case No. CV-2007-8274 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON MERS' MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER, PARKWEST'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL, MERS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS, 
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND 
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MERS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER, PARKWEST'S MOTION TO COMPEL, MERS' MOTION TO DISMISS, 
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESIDENTIAL'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE - 1 
481 
Procedural History 
This action was initiated by Plaintiff ParkWest Homes, LLC (ParkWest) by Verified 
Complaint to Foreclose Lien on August 7, 2007, followed by the First Amended Complaint filed 
on September 12, 2007. A Second Amended Complaint was filed on October 6, 2008. 1 
On January 6, 2009, the Honorable Gordon Petrie2 issued a Memorandum Decision on 
Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS) Motion for Summary 
Judgment granting the motion in favor of MERS. Judgment was entered on January 26, 2009. 
Thereafter, ParkWest appealed the matter to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho 
Supreme Court reversed Judge Petrie's decision and remanded this matter to this court on June 
28,2010. The Remittitur was issued on July 22, 2010. 
On September 14, 2010, ParkWest filed a Supplemental Amended Complaint to 
Foreclose Lien. MERS' Answer to Supplemental Amended Complaint was filed on October 7, 
2010. On November 10, 2010, this court granted an Order on Stipulation to allow Defendant 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings (Residential) to intervene as a party to this action. 
Residential's Answer and Counterclaim on Intervention was filed on November 15, 2010. 
ParkWest filed an Answer to Counterclaim in Intervention on November 30, 2010. 
On November 12, 2010, MERS filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Protective 
Order along with supporting memoranda and affidavits. ParkWest filed an Objection to Motion 
to Dismiss MERS on November 29, 2010. MERS' Reply Memorandum was filed on December 
7, 2010. ParkWest filed a Motion to Compel along with supporting affidavit on November 23, 
2010, and MERS' Opposition to the Motion to Compel was filed on December 2, 2010. 
1 ParkWest, MERS and Defendant Julie Barnson stipulated to the entry of default judgment against Barnson on 
October 7, 2008. 
2 Judge Petrie retired from the bench in January 2009. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MERS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER, PARKWEST'S MOTION TO COMPEL, MERS' MOTION TO DISMISS, 
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESIDENTIAL'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE - 2 
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ParkWest filed a Reply Memorandum on the Motion to Compel on December 7, 2010. The 
Motion to Compel and Motion to Dismiss were scheduled for hearing on December 9, 2010, but 
the parties represented on the record that a tentative agreement had been reached to resolve the 
pending issues and the motion hearing was vacated. 
On November 17, 2010, Residential filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with 
ParkWest's Opposition being filed on December 27, 2010. Residential's Reply Memorandum 
was filed on January 5, 2011. 
On January 5, 2011 Residential filed a Motion in Limine along with supporting 
memorandum. Also filed that day was MERS' Supplemental Memorandum on Motion to 
Compel, the Motion to Dismiss, and the Motion for Protective Order. On January 10, 2011, 
ParkWest filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine/Surreply to MSJ. 
A hearing was held on all pending motions on January 13, 2011. Robert Bums appeared 
on behalf of ParkWest, while Ryan McFarland and Jake McGrady appeared on behalf of MERS 
and Residential. 
Motion to Compel and Motion for Protective Order 
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 30, and 37, ParkWest asks this court to 
order MERS to (1) provide substantive responses to discovery requests served on October 13, 
2010 and (2) to designate and produce a deposition representative pursuant to IRCP 30(b)(6). 
MERS, on the other hand, seeks relief from these discovery requests pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26( c) because MERS no longer has an interest in the property and is seeking to 
be dismissed from this action. 
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As noted above, the parties attempted to resolve these issues during an in chambers 
meeting prior to the December 2010 motion hearing, however, the parties subsequently disagreed 
about whether the terms of the resolution had been satisfied. At the oral argument held on 
January 13,2011, counsel for MERS articulated its belief that because MERS no longer has any 
interest in the property and because MERS has disclosed its entire file with respect to this 
property that it should not be required to respond to additional written discovery and/or an IRCP 
30(b)(6) deposition. However, MERS did indicate a willingness to participate in the deposition, 
if ParkWest agreed to conduct the deposition at the location where the MERS 30(c)(6) designee 
was located.3 ParkWest is concerned that its ability to try this case would be prejudiced should it 
agree to dismiss MERS from this action prior to completing the discovery it deems necessary. 
ParkWest also argues that in the absence of certain admissions by MERS, ParkWest may 
encounter difficulty introducing MERS documents and information into evidence during trial if 
MERS was no longer a party. ParkWest also argues that it should be allowed to conduct the 
deposition of MERS designated representative in Idaho to avoid the expense and inconvenience 
of travel to the location of the MERS deponent. 
During the hearing on these issues, counsel for MERS and Residential made the 
representation that since MERS has disclosed its entire file through discovery, that Residential 
would not object to ParkWest's offer of the MERS documents on the basis of inadequate source 
foundation. That is, while Residential maintained its right to object to documents on other 
grounds, it would not raise an issue as to the validity of the documents. In addition, counsel for 
MERS represented to the court that in its discovery responses MERS had admitted that the 
3 It was represented to the court that the deponent is located in Texas. 
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documents produced are genuine and are accurate copies of the documents retained in the MERS 
file which were maintained in the ordinary course of MERS conduct of business. 
In addressing another unresolved issue between MERS and ParkWest, counsel for MERS 
also asserted that MERS maintains the position that at all times relevant to this action it had 
priority over the Park West lien, but that since the foreclosure of the property more particularly 
described below, MERS no longer maintains that it has an interest in the property pursuant to 
either the first or second deeds of trust recorded. 
In light of the foregoing and because ParkWest has not identified for the record other 
specific discovery responses that remain unanswered or unsatisfactorily answered, this court will 
grant MERS Motion for Protective Order as it relates to written discovery. Having so ruled, the 
court denies ParkWest's Motion to Compel as it relates to written discovery. The court finds that 
MERS has disclosed its entire file and has made the above representations that should satisfy the 
concerns expressed by Park West. 
As for the issue of the deposition, the court will grant ParkWest's Motion to Compel 
MERS to identify and produce for deposition an IRCP 30(b)(6) designee. The court finds that 
given the procedural history of this action and the status ofMERS at this junction of the case that 
MERS will, in the interest of judicial economy and resolution, submit to a deposition. MERS 
Motion for Protective Order as to the request to submit to a deposition is denied. 
Finally, the court must address the matter as to where the deposition will take place. 
MERS argues that it should not be forced to come to Idaho because the deponent is not located 
here, the file is not located here, and because MERS has no interest in the subject property. 
ParkWest argues that it should be allowed to bring the MERS deponent to Idaho because it 
would reduce the expense for both sides. Neither party has submitted authority from this 
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jurisdiction as to the court's discretion, or lack thereof. MERS cites to O'Sullivan v. Rivera, 229 
F.R.D. 187 (D.N.M. 2004) in which the United States District Court of New Mexico stated that 
"An out-of-state deponent is under no obligation to travel to the location where the case was filed 
for a deposition." Id, at 188. The court also stated that "[i]n the absence of exceptional or 
unusual circumstances, when a deponent resides at a substantial distance from the deposing 
party's residence, the deposing party should be required to take the deposition at a location in the 
vicinity in which the deponent resides, even if the deponent is a party." Id, at 189 citing Metrex 
Research Corp. v. United States, 151 F.R.D. 122 (D.Colo.1993). 
ParkWest cites to Dagen v. CFC Group Holdings Ltd., 2003 WL 21910861 
S.D.N.Y.2003 (unpublished opinion) for the idea that a court may overcome the "familiar 
presumption in favor of locating a deposition at the deponent's residence or place of business" 
when the plaintiff shows that "factors of cost, convenience, and litigation efficiency militate in 
favor of' a different location." Id, at *3. 
Recognizing that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26( c) gIves this court discretion to 
consider specific facts and circumstances regarding discovery practices and given the general 
rule as to the location of a deposition of an out-of-state defendant, this court finds that if 
ParkWest intends to pursue the deposition of MERS it shall do so in the location of the MERS 
representative designated pursuant to IRCP 30(b)(6). The court finds that given MERS limited 
remaining involvement in this action, MERS' representation that it has disclosed its entire file, 
and the fact that the location of the file is not in Idaho are all factors weighing in favor of MERS 
position at this time. This court recognizes that ParkWest may face expenses related to travel in 
pursuing the deposition, however, ParkWest has other options available to it to minimize the 
expenses related to conducting this deposition. The court does find merit in the position that 
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financial institution doing busine.ss in this state should be prepared to make designated 
representatives available for deposition in this state although their headquarters or records may 
be located in another state. The court denies ParkWest's Motion to Compel MERS to bring its 
IRCP 30(b)(6) deponent to Idaho and grants MERS' Motion for Protective Order as to the same 
Issue. 
Having so found, ParkWest's Motion to Compel is granted in part, and denied in part and 
MERS' Motion for Protective Order is granted in part, and denied in part as set forth above. 
However, the preceding rulings are most likely moot in light of the court's decision on the other 
issues discussed in this memorandum decision. 
MERS' Motion to Dismiss 
At this time, MERS seeks dismissal from this action because it no longer holds any 
interest in the subject property and is therefore, not a real party in interest from which ParkWest 
may obtain relief. ParkWest objects to the dismissal because MERS has at all times heretofore 
asserted a claim for priority over Park West's lien and without acknowledgement from MERS 
that MERS does not intend to assert that claim in the future, Park West needs MERS to be 
retained as a party to its action. 
In the Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien filed on September 14,2010, 
Park West alleges that MERS was the beneficiary under two deeds of trust encumbering the 
subject property (Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999 
recorded November 14, 2006). (Supplemental Amended Complaint ~ 3). ParkWest also alleges 
that pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 45-506 and 45-512 that the MERS Deeds of Trust are junior in 
priority to the liens filed by ParkWest. (Supplemental Amended Complaint ~ 16). Thus, 
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ParkWest prayed for a determination that its lien had priority over the MERS Deeds of Trust and 
that ParkWest should be allowed to foreclose its lien. 
The following facts (as taken from the affidavits submitted in support and opposition of 
this motion) are relevant to the court's determination as to whether or not MERS should be 
allowed to be released from this action: 
• MERS recorded two deeds of trust with the Canyon County Recorder on November 14, 
2006 as Inst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999. 
• MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust. 
• Transnation Title was the "Trustee" of the Deeds of Trust. 
• On June 28, 2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of 
the First Deed of Trust (Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007044840). 
• On July 20, 2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's 
Deed following a Trustee's Sale. 
• On November 10, 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing 
Residential to intervene as a party to this action. 
• On November 15,2010, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention in 
this action. 
While it is true that up until the time that Residential intervened in this action MERS 
acted as if it maintained an interest in the property, the court cannot find that to be the case any 
longer. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "Lien foreclosures under I.C. § 45-501 et seq. are 
strictly actions in rem and are not in personam proceedings: 'The lien statute operates in rem, 
and not in personam. It creates no personal charge against the owner of the property, but rather a 
charge against the property to the extent of its value.' " Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 
139 Idaho 846, 87 P.3d 955 (2004), citing Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 44, 539 P.2d 590, 596 
(1975). In addition, Idaho Code § 45-1510 states that once a trustee's deed is recorded it 
becomes prima facie evidence in favor of a purchaser in good faith for value or any successor 
interest. Idaho Code § 45-1513 provides that a deed of trust or transfer of any interest in real 
property in trust to secure the performance of any obligation shall be a conveyance of real 
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property. Thus, once Residential became the owner of the property pursuant to the Trustee's 
Deed, MERS' interest was extinguished. It is true that MERS continued to defend this action 
throughout the appellate process but sought to have Residential joined as a party once the matter 
was remanded to this court. 
Additional support for MERS' position is found in the parties own agreements and 
correspondence. The court notes that in the Stipulation to Intervene, filed on November 4, 2010, 
the parties agreed that Residential acquired the property pursuant to the Trustee's Deed and is 
now the record owner of the property. The court also notes that Exhibits B and C to the 
Affidavit of Ryan McFarland filed on January 5, 2011 contained emails and a proposed Partial 
Judgment in which it is clear that ParkWest contemplates dismissal ofMERS if the court retains 
jurisdiction over MERS discovery responses and a request for attorney fees. 
In this case, ParkWest has asserted an interest, via its lien, in the subject property and 
only against the property. However, ParkWest does not retain a cause of action against MERS, 
which lost its interest in the property as a result of the execution and delivery of the Trustee's 
Deed transferring the property to Residential. ParkWest appears to recognize that dismissal of 
MERS may be appropriate but has articulated concerns about the procedural effect of dismissal 
of MERS on their claims in this action. 
The court concludes that MERS no longer retains an interest in the subject property 
because that interest has been transferred to Residential via the Trustee's Deed as noted above. 
MERS' Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
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Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and 
affidavits on file show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c); City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indemnity 
Co., 126 Idaho 604, 606 (1995). At all times, the burden of proving the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact rests upon the moving party. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 
Idaho 514,517 (1991). 
In consideration of the motion, the court must liberally construe the facts and inferences 
contained in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 
119 Idaho 539, 541 (1991). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving 
party's case must be anchored in something more solid than speculation. A mere scintilla of 
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 Idaho 851 
(Ct. App. 1986). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not merely rest on 
the allegations contained in the pleadings; rather, evidence by way of affidavit or deposition 
must be produced to contradict the assertions of the moving party. Ambrose v. Buhl School Dist. 
#412, 126 Idaho 581 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary judgment when the plaintiff fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, an on 
which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 
1992). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima 
facie case. In such cases, there can be "no genuine issue of material fact," since a complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial. Id. citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 
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(1986). This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial. Id. 
Summary judgment dismissing a claim is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to submit evidence 
to establish an essential element of the claim. Nelson v. City of Rupert, 128 Idaho 199, 202 
(1996). 
As indicated above, Residential is the current owner of the property at issue in this case, 
and the sole defendant remaining in the action. The following time line is relevant to the issues to 
be considered by the court in these motions: 
• On March 15, 2006, Park West contracted with Barnson to build a home on the property. 
• On May 18,2006, ParkWest commenced construction of improvements on the Property. 
• On November 14, 2006, MERS recorded two deeds of trust with the Canyon County 
Recorder as Inst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999. 
o MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust. 
o Transnation Title was the "Trustee" of the Deeds of Trust. 
• On November 28, 2006, ParkWest filed its Lien against the property as Canyon County 
Recorder Inst. No. 200694511. 
• On June 28, 2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of 
the First Deed of Trust (Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007044840). 
• On August 7, 2007, ParkWest filed its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien, naming 
Bamson and MERS as defendants. 
• On August 13,2007, ParkWest recorded a lis pendens as Canyon County Recorder Inst. 
No. 2007055927. An amended lis pendens was recorded on September 13, 2007 as 
Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007062387. 
• On July 20, 2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's 
Deed following a Trustee's Sale. 
• On November 10, 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing 
Residential to intervene as a party to this action. 
• On November 15,2010, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention. 
In its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention filed on November 15,2010, Residential 
asserts a counterclaim against ParkWest and seeks a Declaratory Judgment that: 
Residential took clean title to the Property via the Trustee's Deed, that 
ParkWest's failure to name Transnation and First American as Defendants in this 
action within six months of filing the Lien means that ParkWest's Lien is void as 
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to Transnation, First American, and Residential under Idaho Code section 45-510, 
and that ParkWest has no right, title or interest in the Property. 
Counterclaim in Intervention 112 
In its Answer to Counterclaim in Intervention, filed on November 30, 2010, ParkWest 
asserts as an Affirmative Defense that: 
Residential had actual and/or constructive notice of ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien 
as of the date of the Trustee's Deed .... , Residential's interest in the property at 
issue is subject to (a) the senior and superior rights of ParkWest in said property, 
and (b) the "law of the case" established by the decision in ParkWest Homes LLC 
v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), including all matters that were 
embraced by the judgment from which the first appeal was taken but not raised in 
that appeal. 
Answer to Counterclaim in Intervention 1 5. 
Residential seeks summary jUdgment on the grounds that ParkWest did not commence an 
action against Residential (or its predecessor) within 6 months of filing the mechanic's lien as 
required by I.C. 45-510. Residential asserts that it owns the property free and clear of the Lien 
and ParkWest's claims against the property. The motion is supported by the Affidavit of Ryan 
McFarland that provides the relevant documents detailing the status of the parties at issue in the 
motion. ParkWest opposes the motion and argues both that Residential is bound by the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision as to the validity ofthe lien and that Residential is bound by the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision because it took ownership of the property after ParkWest filed a lis 
pendens. 
Residential has also filed a Motion in Limine seeking an order from the court regarding 
the effect of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Barnson. Specifically, Residential argues 
that the Idaho Supreme Court only addressed the issues of (1) validity of the lien and the 
verification requirements; (2) validity of the lien and the Idaho Contractor's Registration Act; 
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" 
and (3) that the construction contract was void as an illegal contract. To that extent, Residential 
argues that ParkWest must prove all other aspects of the validity of the lien. While the court 
would not generally address such a motion in conjunction with the analysis on summary 
judgment, the court finds that it must address the "law of the case" arguments propounded by 
ParkWest for both motions and will do so below. 
The "law of the case" and the Ramson decision 
After Judge Petrie entered summary judgment in favor ofMERS, ParkWest appealed that 
decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed Judge Petrie's decision 
and remanded the matter back to this court. In the decision issued as ParkWest Homes LLC v. 
Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the following 
Issues: 
1) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest's claim of lien did not substantially 
comply with I.C. 45-507? 
2) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest's claimed lien was unenforceable 
because the construction contract was void for failure to comply with the Contractor's 
Act? 
3) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest did not plead a claim for unjust 
enrichment? 
4) Is MERS entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal? 
In support of its position, ParkWest relies on the following two statements made by the 
appellate court, "[w]e hold that the claim of lien substantially complied with Idaho Code § 45-
507 and that the lien was valid for labor and materials supplied after the contractor registered.," 
and "[t]hus, ParkWest is entitled to a lien for work or labor it provided and materials it supplied 
during the time that it was duly registered." Id. ParkWest relies on these statements in order to 
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," 
demonstrate that the "law of the case" is that the lien at issue is valid and that the lien's validity 
cannot be challenged after such a holding by the appellate court. 
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case 
presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such 
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent 
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives 
LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 153 P.3d 1158 (2007), citing Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 
P.3d 973, 976 (2000). It has also been held that the law of the case may prevent consideration on 
a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier 
appeal. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 (2009). 
In this case, the court recognizes that it is bound by the determinations made by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Barnson, however, the court does not find that the decision in Barnson 
controls all aspects of the remainder of this case. The court finds that the holdings in Barnson 
must be considered within the context of the Idaho Supreme Court's overall ruling as to the 
specific issues pending before it at the time that it issued the decision. As noted above, the court 
addressed four specific issues on appeal directly related to the issues decided by Judge Petrie in 
his summary judgment order. 
At issue before Judge Petrie and the Idaho Supreme Court was the issue of whether the 
ParkWest lien complied with Idaho Code 45-507(3) (relating to an amount claimed after 
deduction of all just credits and offsets) and 45-507(4) (relating to the verification requirements). 
Also at issue on appeal was the issue of whether ParkWest's failure to register pursuant to the 
Idaho Contractors Registration Act completely invalidated the lien, and the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that the lien was valid as to work completed after the contractor registered. 
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To the extent that those aspects of the validity of the ParkWest lien were at issue in the 
then pending motion for summary judgment, ParkWest is correct that this court could not make a 
finding that differed from the Idaho Supreme Court's holding on those issues. However, 
nowhere in that appellate decision does the Idaho Supreme Court indicate that ParkWest's lien is 
valid and enforceable and not challengeable as to all the other lien requirements found in Idaho 
Code 45-501 et seq nor did the Idaho Supreme Court indicate that on remand that the district 
court would be foreclosed from considering other aspects of the lien's validity not specifically 
addressed by the Court in its appellate decision. It is true that the introduction to the appellate 
decision indicates that the "claim oflien substantially complied with Idaho Code 45-507 and that 
the lien was valid for labor and materials supplied after the contractor registered". When that 
statement is considered in the context of the issues presented to the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
court's overall decision on those issues, this court does not conclude that it is precluded from 
addressing Residential's motion for summary judgment based on the requirement that all parties 
in interest must be named in the Complaint filed within six months of the recording of the lien. 
ParkWest also argues that Residential is foreclosed from raising other lien validity issues 
because it did not raise those issues, specifically the issue of whether the lien is void as to 
Residential, before the district court during the first motion for summary judgment or during the 
appeal of Judge Petrie's decision. While it may be argued in some cases that the "law of the 
case" doctrine should be so applied, this court does not conclude Residential or its predecessors 
in interest could have raised the issue or were obligated to raise the issue in the prior proceedings 
because those entities were not parties to this case at that time. 
Thus, the court concludes that the Barnson appellate decision does not, as a matter of 
law, preclude the consideration by this court of Residential's pending motion for summary 
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judgment because the current issues raised by Residential were not, nor likely could have been, 
raised either before Judge Petrie or during the appeal of his decision because neither Residential 
nor its predecessor in interest were named parties to this action at the time Judge Petrie decided 
the issues previously appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Consistent with this conclusion, this court grants Residential's motion in limine regarding 
the "law of the case" to the extent that ParkWest may only rely on the Barnson appellate 
decision as the "law of the case" to the extent that the Idaho Supreme Court ruled on the 
elements of lien validity presented to it during that appeal and that all other aspects of lien 
validity not raised before Judge Petrie or during the appeal of his decision remain issues to be 
decided by this court. 
The effect of ParkWest's failure to name Residential or its predecessor in interest as a 
~ 
Residential seeks summary judgment on the grounds that ParkWest failed to comply with 
Idaho Code 45-510 and thus, the lien is void as to ParkWest. Idaho Code 45-510 states "[n]o lien 
provided for in this chapter binds any building .. .improvement or structure for a longer period 
than six (6) months after the claim has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a proper 
court within that time to enforce such lien. I.C. 45-510. 
This statute provides the court with jurisdiction to enforce a lien when certain conditions 
are met, among those conditions being the commencement of the action to enforce the lien 
within six months of the filing of the lien. Palmer v. Bradford, 86 Idaho 395, 388 P.2d 96 
(1963). The court's jurisdiction is extinguished after that time period has passed because, it has 
been held, that after that point, the lien no longer exists. Id. That is, failure to commence an 
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action to foreclose a lien within the six-month period voids the lien, and the court is to treat it as 
if it never existed. 
It has also been held that the requirement to commence the action within six months 
applies to all parties who hold an interest in the property. In Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104,298 
P.2d 972 (1956), the Idaho Supreme Court found that the lienholder's failure to name the 
wife/co-owner of the property as a party to the action invalidated the lien as to her interest in the 
property. The court went on to find that because her interest could not be separated from her 
husband's interest, then the right to foreclose the lien was lost entirely. Id. This doctrine was 
recognized in Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 682 
P.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1984) in which the Idaho Court of Appeals found that "our Supreme Court 
had held that a lien foreclosure action must be commenced within six months against the persons 
versus whose interests the lien is being asserted; otherwise the lien was lost as to those persons." 
Id. In that case, the Court of Appeals addressed the language ofIdaho Code 45-1302 that states, 
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon real property or a lien on 
or security interest in personal property, the plaintiff, cross-complainant or 
plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same cause of action, 
any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having, claiming or 
appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any part of the 
real or personal property involved therein, and the court shall, in addition to 
granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or interest of all 
parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect as in the 
action to quiet title. 
Idaho Code 45-1302. 
In addressing the potential conflict between I.C. 45-1302 and 45-510 in which it appears 
that a plaintiff "may" name a potential defendant holding an interest in the property at issue in a 
lien foreclosure action with the requirement that a lien foreclosure action must be commenced 
within six months, the Court of Appeals held that "I.C. § 45-1302 does not enable a materialman 
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to foreclose a lien as against other interested parties without gIvmg them notice of the 
proceedings." Bonner, supra. They then held that while the plaintiff, Bonner, was not required 
to name Standard as a party to the foreclosure action pursuant to I.C. 45-130, the "the failure to 
do so left Standard's interest in the property unaffected by the foreclosure." Id. The court went 
on to find that "[because Bonner failed to foreclose against Standard within six months of the 
filing of its claim of lien, it lost its lien against the property in regard to Standard. For the 
purpose of the instant case, Bonner's lien was extinguished. Standard's interest in the property 
should be confirmed by the district court, free of Bonner's lien." Id. 
In this case, prior to Residential's intervention into the action, the only named defendants 
in this action were Julie Bamson and MERS. ParkWest did not name as a defendant either 
Transnation Title, the original trustee under the MERS deeds of trust, nor did it name First 
American Title, who was the designated successor trustee to the MERS deeds of trust at the time 
the Complaint was filed in August 2007. It is undisputed that the ParkWest lien was filed on 
November 282006, and the action was filed on August 7, 2007. Thus, it is clear from the record 
that ParkWest failed to name either Transnation or First American within the six month 
limitation provided for by Idaho Code 45-510. 
First American was the trustee pursuant to the MERS Deeds of Trust at the time the 
Verified Complaint was filed in this case. Residential argues that First American was a necessary 
party to this action because it was the Trustee ofthe Deed of Trust. Idaho Code 45-1502 defines 
"trustee" as a person to whom legal title is conveyed by trust deed, and "trustee deed" is a deed 
conveying real property to a trustee. A deed of trust is a conveyance of real property, and legal 
title to the property is conveyed by the deed of trust to the trustee. See I.e. 45-1513 and 
Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d 222 (1999). Thus, Residential argues 
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that the trustee is a necessary party because it is the party holding legal title to the property. This 
argument is supported by 52 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics Liens 369 (2010) which states: 
In a jurisdictions in which a deed of trust or mortgage is effective as a transfer of 
legal title to the secured party, the trustee of a deed of trust recorded before 
attachment of a mechanic's lien is a necessary party to a suit to enforce the 
mechanic's lien; if the trustee is not a party to the enforcement suit, the mechanic's 
lien cannot be enforced. Thus, the court in such a case must have jurisdiction over 
the person of the trustee before the court can divest the trustee of title. The 
beneficiary of a deed of trust that is inferior to the mechanic's lien is also a 
necessary party in a title-theory jurisdiction, since such a beneficiary holds an 
interest that may be defeated or diminished if the mechanic's lien is enforced. 
52 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics Liens 369 (2010). 
This court agrees with Residential assertion that First American, as the designated 
successor trustee was a necessary party to this action because First American, as the trustee, held 
the power of sale and the power to convey legal title in the property. ParkWest's failed to name 
First American as a party defendant in this action or otherwise proceed against the trustee in its 
action and thus, Park West's lien is not valid as to First American pursuant to I.C. 45-510 and the 
authority cited above. Thus, when First American conveyed title to Residential via the Trustee's 
Deed, Residential took title to the property free of the lien's encumbrance. As noted in Palmer, 
the failure to commence an action pursuant to a lien within the six months results in the finding 
that no lien existed at the time of the trustee's sale. ParkWest also argues that while it may be 
precluded from foreclosing the lien as to Residential's interest in the property, that Residential 
took the property subject to the lis pendens that had been recorded prior the time of the trustee's 
sale. 
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The effect of the lis pendens 
ParkWest argues that because Residential acquired its interest after the lis pendens was 
recorded, then Residential is bound by the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Barnson, 
ParkWest's argument rests on its "law of the case" arguments addressed above. ParkWest 
argues that that a party with notice of a lis pendens takes the property subject to the rights of the 
parties in the action. See Sartain v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 775 P.2d 
161 (Ct. App. 1989). See also 54 CJS Lis Pendens 46 (2005). 
Idaho Code 5-505 provides the following with regards to the effect of a lis pendens: 
In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant at the time of filing 
his answer, when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in which the 
property or some part thereof is situated, a notice of the pendency of the action, 
containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a 
description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing 
such notice for record only shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the 
action, and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real names. 
I.C. 5-505 . (emphasis added). 
This code section codifies the common law principle that "when a third party-with actual 
or constructive notice of a pending action involving real property-acquires an interest in that real 
property from a party to the action, then the third party takes subject to the rights ofthe parties in 
the action as finally determined by the judgment or decree." Sartain v. Fidelity Financial 
Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 775 P.2d 161 (Ct. App.1989). Thus, when a subsequent purchaser 
of the property has actual notice of a pending action affecting the property, it takes that property 
subject to the pending action, however, if the party takes an interest in the affected property prior 
to notice of the pending action, it is not bound by the subsequent judgment or decree unless it is 
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made a party to the action. Id. 
In this case, the court has found that the Barnson decision only dealt with the elements of 
the validity of the lien specifically addressed in the decision and that all other aspects of lien 
validity were unresolved. Thus, ParkWest's reliance on the law of the case with respect to the lis 
pendens argument is misplaced and denied for the reasons discussed above. 
In addition, the court finds that the plain language of I.C. 5-505 requires a lis pendens to 
contain "the names of the parties" which in this case were, at the filing of the lis pendens, 
Bamson and MERS. See Memorandum in Opposition to Residential's Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed December 27, 2010. Thus, neither Transnation nor First American were named 
as a party to the action, nor were they listed as parties to the action in the lis pendens. Thus, 
there would be no constructive or actual knowledge of the lien imputed to a purchaser of the 
property who would be obtaining legal title to the property from the trustee, First American. 
Therefore, the court finds that Residential should be granted the summary judgment that 
it has requested because there was no valid lien encumbering the trustee's interest in the property 
pursuant to I.C. 45-510 and First American was not a named party to the action when the 
complaint was filed or within the mandated six month period of the filing of the lien and the lis 
pendens failed to name Residential or its predecessors in interest, the trustees under the relevant 
deeds of trust pursuant to I.e. 5-505. 
In making this decision, the court has considered the pleadings, depositions, admissions 
and affidavits offered in support and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and 
finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Residential is entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
For the reasons set forth above, Residential's motion for summary judgment is granted 
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and ParkWest's claims against Residential are dismissed. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above: 
1. Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's motion for summary judgment 
filed November 17,2010 is granted and ParkWest Homes, LLC claims against 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC are dismissed. 
2. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.'s motion to dismiss filed November 
12,2010 is granted and ParkWest Homes, LLC's claims against Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. are dismissed. 
3. Although rendered moot by the decisions to grant the motion to dismiss and for 
summary judgment set forth above, MERS motion for a protective order, 
Residential's motion in limine, and ParkWest's motion to compel the deposition of 
the MERS representative are all granted to the extent set forth in this order. 
4. The attorneys for the Defendants Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC and 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. shall submit proposed judgments in 
compliance with IRCP 54(a) within ten days of this order. Any request for an award 
of costs and attorney fees shall be submitted pursuant to applicable Idaho rule, statute 
or precedent. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on JiL day of February, 2011, slhe served a true and correct 
copy of the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the manner 
described: 
• upon counsel for plaintiff, 
Robert B. Burns 
Moffatt, Thomas Barrett, Rock and Fields, Chartered 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
• upon counsel for defendants 
Ryan T. McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis, and Hawley, LLP 
877 West Main St., Ste. 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
• upon counsel for Julie Bamson 
David E. Wishney 
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0837 
and/or when s/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the u.S. Mail with sufficient 
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
Chris Yamamoto, Clerk of the Court 
By: ____ ~~~------------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
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JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, as nominee for 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/k/a 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a 
Delaware limited liability company; and 
DOES 1-10; 
Defendants, 
and 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company, 
Defendant/Intervenor. 
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PlaintiffParkWest Homes LLC ("ParkWest") hereby moves the Court pursuant to 
LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) for reconsideration of its order, filed February 16, 2011, granting summary 
judgment to Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") and dismissing 
ParkWest's claims against Residential. 
This motion is based on the following grounds: 
(a) the entry of final judgment against Julie G. Bamson in ParkWest's favor 
on October 7, 2008, which granted ParkWestjudgment for $141,208.39, together with 
prejudgment interest and costs and attorney fees in the amounts therein specified, to the extent of 
Bamson's interest in the residential property at issue in this lien foreclosure action (the 
"Property") ; 
(b) the following facts set forth in this court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order on MERS' Motion for Protective Order, ParkWest's Motion to Compel, MERS' Motion to 
Dismiss, Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Residential's Motion in Limine, filed 
February 16,2011 ("Memorandum Decision"): 
• On March 15,2006, ParkWest contracted with Bamson to build a home on the property. 
• On May 18~ 2006. Park West commenced construction of improvements on the Property. 
• On- November 14, 2006, MERS recorded two deeds of trust with the Canyon County 
Recorder as lnst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999. 
o MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust. 
o Transnation Title was the 'Vfrustee" of the Deeds of Trust. 
• On November 28, 2006, ParkWest filed its Lien against the property as Canyon County 
Recorder Inst. No. 200694511. 
• On June 28, 2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of 
the First Deed of Trust (Canyon County Recorder lost. No. 2007044840). 
• On August 7, 2007, ParkWest flled its Verified Complaint t'? Foreclose Lien, naming 
Bamson and MERS as defendants. 
• On August 13,2007, ParkWest recorded a lis pendens as Canyon County Recorder Inst. 
No. 2007055927. An amended /is pendens was recorded on September 13, 2007 as 
Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007062387. 
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• On July 20, 2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's 
Deed following a Trustee ts Sale. . 
• On November 10. 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing 
Residential to intervene as a party to this action. 
• On November 15. 20 10, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention. 
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(c) Application to the foregoing judgment and stated facts of the holdings in 
First National Bank o/Lewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P. 287 (1900) (judgment establishing 
interest in real property constitutes a judgment lien in the property from the date of entry of the 
judgment), and Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) (because "a deed of trust 
is for practical purposes only a mortgage with a power of sale[,]" a conveyance oflegal title by 
the trustee is subject to legal and equitable interests in the property obtained prior to the date of 
the trustee's deed through the owner ofthe property/grantor of the deed oftrust). 
ParkWest desires to file a brief with the court in support of this motion within 14 
days and to present oral argument in support of this motion. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that ParkWest will call up for hearing the foregoing 
motion before the Honorable Bradly S. Ford, at the Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho, 
on Thursday, April 7, 2011, at the hour of9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be 
heard. 
DATED this 22nd day of February 2011. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Case No. CV 07-8274 
JUDGMENT 
Based upon this Court's Memorandum Decision And Order On MERS' Motion For 
Protective Order, ParkWest's Motion To Compel, MERS' Motion To Dismiss, Residential's 
Motion For Summary Judgment, And Residential's Motion In Limine entered in this matter on 
February 16, 2011; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADmDGED, AND DECREED that final judgment is 
awarded in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (flkla Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.) ("MERS") and 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"), and against PlaintiffParkWest 
Homes LLC ("ParkWest") as follows: 
JUDGMENT-I 
508 05000.0047.2268213.2 
1. This above-captioned case, and all claims asserted therein, are, as to MERS, 
dismissed with prejudice in their entirety; 
2. With respect to the real property at issue in this lawsuit (the "Property"), the 
interest of Residential is, for all purposes, prior and senior to ParkWest's interest, including, 
without limitation, ParkWest's mechanic's lien (the "Lien") that is at issue in this above-
captioned action; 
3. Park West's Lien was foreclosed by the trustee's sale pursuant to which 
Residential took title to the Property, and ParkWest's Lien is extinguished by said trustee's sale 
for all purposes and no longer constitutes a lien on the Property; 
4. All claims asserted by ParkWest against the Property and Residential are 
dismissed with prejUdice in their entirety; 
5. This Judgment, along with the Judgment entered against Juli Barnson on October 
7,2008, constitutes a final judgment as to all parties and all claims asserted in this action; 
6. This Court may amend or supplement this judgment at the appropriate time for 
the entry of any ruling on costs and attorneys' fees as appropriate and the Court shall retain 
jurisdiction over this case for ~urposes. 
DATED THIS ~ day of February, 2011. 
JUDGMENT-2 
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Plaintiff ParkWest Homes LLC ("ParkWest") hereby moves the Court pursuant to 
LR.C.P. 59(e) to alter or amend the Judgment entered in favor of Residential Funding Real 
Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") and dismissing ParkWest's lien in the property at issue, 
filed March 1,2011 (the "Judgment"). 
This motion is being filed to protect the district court's jurisdiction to alter or 
amend the Judgment after hearing ParkWest's pending Motion for Reconsideration of Order on 
Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 23,2011, and is based on the 
identical grounds for that motion, as follows: 
(a) the entry of final judgment against Julie G. Bamson in ParkWest's favor 
on October 7,2008, which granted ParkWestjudgment for $141,208.39, together with 
prejudgment interest and costs and attorney fees in the amounts therein specified, to the extent of 
Bamson's interest in the residential property at issue in this lien foreclosure action (the 
"Property") ; 
(b) the following facts set forth in this court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order on MERS' Motion for Protective Order, ParkWest's Motion to Compel, MERS' Motion to 
Dismiss, Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Residential's Motion in Limine, filed 
February 16, 2011 ("Memorandum Decision"): 
• On March 15,2006. Park West contracted with Barnson to build a home on the property. 
• On May 18,2006, ParkWest commenced construction of improvements on the Property. 
• On-November 14, 2006, MERS recOided two deeds of trust with the Canyon County 
Recorder as Inst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999. 
o MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust. 
o Transnation Title was the "Trustee" of the Deeds of Trust. 
• On November 28, 2006~ ParkWest filed its Lien against the property as Canyon County 
Recorder Inst. No. 200694511. 
• On June 28.2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of 
the First Deed of Trust (Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007044840). 
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• On August 7, 2007, ParkWest fi.Ied its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien, naming 
Barnson and MERS as defendants. 
• On August 13. 2007, ParkWest recorded a lis pendens as Canyon County Recorder Inst 
No. 2007055927. An amended lis pendens was recorded on September 13, 2007 as 
Canyon County Recorder lnst No. 2007062387. 
• On July 20,2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's 
Deed following a Trustee's Sale. 
• On November 10, 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing 
Residential to intervene as a party to this action. 
• On November 15,2010, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention. 
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( c) Application to the foregoing judgment and stated facts of the holdings in 
First National Bank o/Lewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P. 287 (1900) (judgment establishing 
interest in real property constitutes a judgment lien in the property from the date of entry of the 
judgment), and Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) (because "a deed of trust 
is for practical purposes only a mortgage with a power of sale[,]" a conveyance of legal title by 
the trustee is subject to legal and equitable interests in the property obtained prior to the date of 
the trustee's deed through the owner of the property/grantor of the deed of trust). 
ParkWest desires to file a brief with the court in support of this motion within 14 
days and to present oral argument in support of this motion. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that ParkWest will call up for hearing the foregoing 
motion before the Honorable Bradly S. Ford, at the Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho, 
on Thursday, April 7, 2011, at the hour of9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be 
heard. 
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DATED this 3rd day of March 2011. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The stated basis for the Court granting summary judgment to Defendant 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") against PlaintiffParkWest 
Homes LLC ("ParkWest") is as follows: 
ParkWest's [sic] failed to name [trustee] First American as a party 
defendant in this action or otherwise proceed against the trustee in 
its action and thus, ParkWest's lien is not valid as to First 
American pursuant to I.e. 45-510 and the authority cited above. 
Thus, when First American conveyed title to Residential via the 
Trustee's Deed, Residential took title to the property free of the 
lien's encumbrance. As noted in Palmer, the failure to commence 
an action pursuant to a lien within the six months results in the 
finding that no lien existed at the time of the trustee's sale. 
Memorandum Decision and Order ("Memorandum Decision"), filed February 16, 2011, p. 19 
(underscoring added). And based on the foregoing ruling, the Court entered Judgment, filed 
March 1, 2011, that "[ w ]ith respect to the real property at issue in this lawsuit (the 'Property'), 
the interest of Residential is, for all purposes, prior and senior to ParkWest's interest, including, 
without limitation, ParkWest's mechanic's lien (the 'Lien') that is at issue in this above-
captioned action .... " Judgment' 2. 
The Court has thus expressly held that ParkWest's mechanic's lien was invalid 
against First American and Residential. However, not addressed in either party's briefing to the 
Court, nor therefore by the Court in its Memorandum Decision, was the fact and effect of the 
final judgment that was previously entered in this lawsuit against Defendant Julie G. Bamson 
("Bamson"), who was then the owner ofthe Property. Accordingly, based on the points and 
authorities discussed below, ParkWest requests the Court to reconsider its Memorandum 
Decision and then alter and amend the Judgment to provide that Residential's interest in the 
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Property is subject to thejudgment lien of Park West, to the extent of Bamson's interest in the 
Property at the time that final judgment was entered against her. 
II. FACTS 
Both of ParkW est's pending motions are based on the following grounds: 
(a) the entry of final judgment against Bamson in ParkWest's favor on 
October 7, 2008 (the "Bamson Judgment"), which granted ParkWestjudgment for $141,208.39, 
together with prejudgment interest and costs and attorney fees in the amounts therein specified, 
to the extent of Barns on's interest in the Property;} and 
(b) the following facts set forth in the Memorandum Decision: 
• On March 15,2006, ParkWest contracted with Barnson to build a home on the property. 
• On May 18,2006, ParkWest commenced construction of improvements on the Property. 
• On-November 14, 2006, MERS recorded two deeds of trust with the Canyon County 
Recorder as lnst No. 200690998 and Insf. No. 200690999. 
o MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust. 
o Transnation Title was the "Trustee" of the Deeds of Trust. 
• On November 28. 2006, ParkWest filed its Lien against the property as Canyon County 
Recorder Jnst. No. 200694511. 
• On Jooe 28,2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of 
the First Deed of Trust (canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007044840). 
• On August 7. 2007. ParkWest filed its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien, naming 
Bamson and MERS as defendants. 
• On August 13.2007, ParkWest recorded a lis pendens as Canyon County Recorder Inst 
No. 2007055927. An amended lis pendens was recorded on September 13, 2007 as 
Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007062387. 
} The following facts and rule of civil procedure establish that the Bamson Judgment 
constituted a final judgment under Idaho law not later than January 26, 2009 - a date six months 
prior to Residential's acquisition of the Property: (a) the express terms of the Bamson Judgment 
("This Judgment shall be considered to be a final judgment against Bamson and is intended to 
constitute the final judgment against her in this action."), Bamson Judgment ~ 4; (b) the 
Judgment entered in this action by Judge Petrie on January 26,2009, with respect to all parties 
other than Bamson; and (c) I.R.C.P. 54(a) ("A judgment is final if ... judgment has been entered 
on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action."). 
Additionally, of course, the Judgment here at issue also provides that the Bamson Judgment is a 
final judgment. Judgment ~ 5. 
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• On July 20, 2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's 
Deed following a Trustee's Sale. 
• On November 10, 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing 
Residential to intervene as a party to this action. 
• On November 15, 20 10, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention. 
Memorandum Decision 11. 
III. ARGUMENT 
As pled by ParkWest in its Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien 
("Supplemental Complaint"), filed September 14, 2010: 
11. Final judgment was entered in this action against 
Barnson to the extent of her interest in the Property, but not 
personally, pursuant to the terms ofthat certain Default Judgment 
Against Julie G. Bamson Only, filed October 7, 2008, whereunder 
ParkWest was awarded $141,208.39 for the amount owed to 
ParkWest as of November 28, 2006, with respect to its 
construction of improvements to the Property; prejudgment interest 
at the rate of$69.64 per diem from November 28,2006, through 
October 7,2008, which totals $47,285.56 in interest; and 
$33,000.00 for the costs of perfecting and enforcing ParkWest's 
lien, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney fees. 
Supplemental Complaint ~ 11. Both the fact and effect of the Bamson Judgment were thereby 
put squarely at issue in this lawsuit. 
Some of the distinctions between judgment liens and mechanic's liens were 
recently summarized by the Supreme Court of Connecticut: 
A judgment lien is based on a judicial determination of the amount 
of the debt owed by the debtor to the creditor and can be 
independently verified by checking judicial records. A mechanic's 
lien, on the other hand, is based on a contractor's representation of 
the amount owed and cannot be independently verified. 
PNC Bank, NA. v. Kelepecz, 960 A.2d 563,569 (Conn. 2008). Additionally, the very statute 
upon which the Court's holding was based, Idaho Code Section 45-510, further distinguishes 
between the two types of liens by providing a six-month period for the filing of suit to enforce a 
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mechanic's lien and a five-year duration for "[t]he lien of a final judgment obtained on any lien 
provided for in this chapter .... " I.e. § 45-510. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that 
ParkWest both pled and claims a mechanic's lien in the Property vis-a-vis Defendant Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"),2 ParkWest also both pled and claims a 
judgment lien in the Property based on the Bamson Judgment ("ParkWest's Judgment Lien"). 
The Supreme Court of Idaho first held over 1 00 years ago that a judgment lien on 
real property attaches when judgment is entered by the court. This determination was more 
recently confirmed by our Court of Appeals and affirmed by our Supreme Court in Fulton v. 
Duro, 107 Idaho 240,687 P.2d 1367, afl'd, 108 Idaho 392,700 P.2d 14 (1985). As explained in 
Fulton: 
The effect of a judgment lien on real property, which 
property is subsequently conveyed by the judgment debtor, has 
been settled in Idaho since the tum of the century. In First 
National Bank of Lewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P. 287 (1900), 
the bank, purchaser of real property at a sheriff s sale, sought 
possession of the property from Hays, the grantee of the judgment 
debtor, Morrison. In upholding the right of the bank to the 
property, our Supreme Court said: 
[A]s said judgment was of record in the records of the 
district court of Nez Perces [sic] county, it was a lien upon 
said land at the date said judgment debtor, Morrison, 
conveyed said land to [Hays], and [Morrison] could not 
divest it of said lien by a conveyance thereof to [the Hays]. 
Morrison was a party to the action in which said judgment 
was rendered, and his grantees got no greater interest in 
said land than he had at the date of his conveyance to 
them .. " The judgment became a lien on said land on the 
date of its entry, March 9, 1894; and the sheriffs deed by 
relation dated back to the date when the lien of said 
judgment attached to said land, and cut off all subsequent 
liens. As Morrison was defendant and judgment debtor in 
2 Residential intervened as a defendant after the Supplemental Complaint was filed. 
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said suit, and as the [Hays] claim title under conveyance 
from him made subsequent to the entry of said judgment 
and subsequent to the time that said judgment became a 
lien upon said land, they are privies to said judgment, and 
are as conclusively bound thereby, so far as the title to said 
land is concerned, as Morrison himself .... 
Id. at 141-42,61 P. at 288. 
Fulton, 107 Idaho at 245-46,687 P.2d at 1372-73 (emphasis added; brackets and concluding 
ellipsis in original). 
The grounds establishing that Residential acquired the Property subject to 
ParkWest's Judgment Lien are discussed below. 
A. ParkWest's Judgment Lien Relates Back to the Date ParkWest Commenced 
Construction of Improvements on the Property. 
As explained by the United States Supreme Court, the doctrine of relation back 
"merges the attachment lien in the judgment and relates the judgment lien back to the date of 
attachment .... " United States v. Sec. Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950). Accord First 
Mid-Illinois Bank & Trust, NA. v. Parker, 933 N.E.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); 
People's Bank v. Bilmor Bldg. Corp., 614 A.2d 456, 464 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992). Further, "[i]n 
general, a judgment lien against real estate relates back to the date on which the real estate was 
attached." BNC Mortgage, Inc. v. Tax Pros, Inc., 46 P.3d 812, 818 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) 
(footnote with citations to multiple supporting authorities omitted). And consistent with the 
foregoing authorities, it is held that "[t]he lien of judgment for a mechanic's lien relates back to 
the time that the contractor commenced work or first supplied material." J.I Kislak Mortgage 
Corp. o/Delaware v. William Matthews Builder, Inc., 287 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972). 
Accord In re Rainbow Trust, Bus. Trust, 200 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1996), aff'd, 216 B.R. 
77 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997). See also Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, No. 36523,2010 
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WL 5186706, at *8 (Idaho Dec. 23, 2010) (a mechanic's "lien attaches at the time that work is 
commenced under a contract ... "). 
In the present dispute this Court expressly found that "[o]n May 18, 2006, 
ParkWest commenced construction of improvements on the Property." Memorandum 
Decision 11. Thus, by application of the doctrine of relation back, ParkWest's Judgment Lien 
relates back to, and is effective as of, May 18, 2006 - a date six months before MERS recorded 
its two deeds of trust against the Property. Id. 
B. Residential Acquired the Property Subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien. 
As this Court explained: "A deed of trust is a conveyance ofreal property, and 
legal title to the property is conveyed by the deed of trust to the trustee." Memorandum 
Decision 18 (citing I.e. § 45-1513 and Defendant A. v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d 
222 (1999)). However, an issue not addressed in the Memorandum Decision is whether the 
interest in property a trustee under a deed oftrust can convey is subject to divestiture as a result 
of subsequent legal proceedings involving the grantor of the deed of trust. Our Supreme Court 
held in Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585,671 P.2d 1048 (1983), that it is. 
In Long, Defendant Williams granted a deed of trust on land he owned to secure 
payment under a promissory note to A vco, designating Lewis County Abstract Company as the 
trustee. 105 Idaho at 586, 671 P.2d at 1049. A little more than a year after the deed of trust was 
recorded, Williams filed bankruptcy, resulting in his interest in the property passing to the 
bankruptcy estate. Id. The bankruptcy trustee then sold to Avco all of the bankruptcy estate's 
interest in the property, following which A vco caused Lewis County Abstract Company to 
reconvey its interest in the property to Williams. Id. A few months later, Plaintiff Long acquired 
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Avco's interest in the property by quitclaim deed and then filed suit to evict Williams from the 
property. !d. 
In response to Long's suit, Williams contended that he remained the owner of the 
property, arguing that Lewis County Abstract Company had legal title to the property by virtue 
of the deed of trust at the time Williams filed bankruptcy, that therefore the bankruptcy trustee 
could not convey legal title to A vco, and that the deed of reconveyance by Lewis County 
Abstract Company effected the conveyance of all equitable and legal interests in the property 
back to Williams. 105 Idaho at 587, 671 P.2d at 1050. Thus, just as in the present dispute, the 
issue in Long was "whether a deed of trust conveys all legal title to the trustee, or whether the 
passage oftitle to the trustee is, for practical purposes, in the nature of a mortgage with a power 
of sale." Id. 
The Supreme Court determined that Long, and not Williams (as the grantee under 
the trustee's deed), was the owner of the property: 
Therefore, we hold that, even though title passes for the purpose of 
the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage 
with power of sale. 
At the time Williams filed his petition in bankruptcy, he 
had a legal interest in the property which was good against all 
persons except the Lewis County Abstract Company, which held 
nothing more than the power of sale upon the happening of certain 
contingencies. Williams' interest (comprised of all other attributes 
of ownership) passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. Section 541 of 
Title 11 U.S.c. provides: 
"Property of the estate. ( a) The commencement of a case 
under section 301,302, or 303 ofthis title creates an estate. 
Such estate is comprised of all the following property, 
wherever located: (1) ... all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case." 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF (i) MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND (ii) MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT - 8 
523 
Client:1965042.1 
The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed all legal and equitable 
interests of Williams in the subject property to Avco. Avco's 
interest as beneficiary under the Deed of Trust merged with this 
purchased interest. Thus, A vco was the owner of the property and 
entitled to possession .... 
105 Idaho at 587-88, 671 P.2d at 1050-51.3 
The foregoing holding in Long determines that Residential acquired the Property 
subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien for two reasons. 
First, Long categorically establishes that the interest in property a trustee under a 
deed of trust can convey is subject to divestiture as a result of subsequent legal proceedings 
involving the grantor of the deed of trust. Accordingly, when the Barnson Judgment was entered 
in this action, the interest in the Property First American could convey to Residential was 
divested to the extent of Park West's Judgment Lien. 
Second, Long also categorically establishes that the grantor of a deed of trust 
retains all attributes of ownership with respect to the property conveyed under the deed of trust 
other than the power of sale granted the trustee. Accordingly, Residential necessarily acquired 
all attributes of ownership with respect to the Property (other than the power of sale) through 
Barnson. And because these attributes of ownership were acquired through Bamson, Residential 
3 Accord Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 824 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1991): 
Under the rule at common law, a deed of trust places legal title to 
the property in the trustee. Under Idaho law, a deed oftrust is a 
mortgage with a power of sale; the legal title is conveyed to the 
trustee solely for the purpose of security. The deed of trust leaves 
in the grantor a legal estate which entitles the grantor to possession 
of the property and all incidents of ownership; the exception to this 
is the trustee's power to sell the property in the event of the 
grantor's default on the underlying obligation. See Long v. 
Williams . ... 
121 Idaho at 314 n.2, 824 P.2d at 889 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added). 
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had constructive notice of the Bamson Judgment and ParkWest's Judgment Lien when 
Residential purchased the Property, by reason of Park West's two lis pendens recorded against 
the Property some two years prior to Residential's purchase. Memorandum Decision 11. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
ParkWest submits that the just resolution of both ParkWest's claimed mechanic's 
lien and judgment lien in the Property requires due consideration of the legal principles 
established by the opinion in Long v. Williams. Yet neither Long nor Willis v. Realty Country, 
Inc. was even mentioned in the Memorandum Decision. Accordingly, ParkWest respectfully 
requests the Court to reconsider the Memorandum Decision based on the points and authorities 
set forth above and then alter and amend the judgment to provide that Residential's interest in the 
Property is subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien, to the extent of Bam son's interest in the 
Property at the time that final judgment was entered against her. 
DATED this 4th day of March 2011. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
- Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"), by and 
through its counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully files this 
Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration and Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment 
(collectively, "Motions"). 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
ParkWest Homes, LLC's ("ParkWest") latest Motions are refuted by the plain language 
of Idaho statute, by Idaho case law applying Idaho's statutory framework for priority interests in 
property, and by the very cases ParkWest relies upon. It is contrary to the plain language of 
statute for ParkWest to try to bootstrap the priority of its judgment lien (against Bamson) into its 
alleged mechanic's lien priority date. Under ParkWest's argument, a lien claimant could 
establish its priority by colluding with just one person with an interest in the property, obtaining 
a judgment against that person, and then asserting that judgment as binding against all other 
persons with an interest in the subject property. By making this argument, ParkWest is asking 
this Court to set aside an entire body of case and statutory law, and to invite collusion and fraud 
by every single owner in the State of Idaho whose property is encumbered by a mortgage or deed 
of trust. ParkWest's argument should be rejected. 
II. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
1. On March 15,2006, ParkWest illegally contracted with Julie Bamson 
("Barnson") to build a home on the property at issue in this case (the "Property"). See 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Amended Complaint To Foreclose Lien filed in this action (the 
"Amended Complaint"), 1 6. All of the construction costs were paid by construction loan funds 
procured by Bamson; ParkWest received over $60,000 in income from those funds. 
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2. On November 14, 2006, Barnson repaid the construction loan by obtaining a loan 
from Homecomings Financial, LLC ("Homecomings") secured by two Deeds of Trust 
(collectively, the "MERS Deeds of Trust") recorded against the Property. Affidavit Of Ryan T. 
McFarland In Support Of Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion For 
Summary Judgment ("McFarland Aff."), filed in this action on November 17, 2010, ~ 2, Exh. A. 
MERS was the beneficiary, and Transnation Title ("Transnation") was the "Trustee" under the 
MERS Deeds of Trust. McFarland Aff., ~ 2, Exh. A. 
3. On November 28,2006, ParkWest recorded its mechanic's lien (the "Lien") 
against the Property. The Lien rendered the Property valueless as to Barnson and Homecomings: 
Barnson never resided a day at the Property, never received a dollar of rent from the Property, 
and was never able to sell the Property; instead, Bamson incurred a $379,800 liability to 
Homecomings and was forced to file bankruptcy. Homecomings, who was not a party to the 
illegal contract, never received a single payment on its loans but has instead incurred three and 
one-half years (so far) of costs and attorneys' fees in this Court, the United States Bankruptcy 
Court, and the Idaho Supreme Court. 
4. On June 28, 2007, First American Title Insurance Company ("First American") 
was appointed the Trustee of the First MERS Deed of Trust. McFarland Aff., ~ 3, Exh. B. 
5. On August 7, 2007, ParkWest initiated this lawsuit, naming only Barnson and 
MERS as Defendants. ParkWest never named Transnation or First American as a defendant. 
6. On or about September 30,2008, ParkWest and Barnson filed a Stipulation For 
Entry Of Default Judgment (the "StipUlation") which permitted ParkWest to take "immediate 
possession of the Property;" in exchange, ParkWest agreed to "waive and release[] Bamson from 
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any personal liability related to or arising out of Park West' s improvement of the Property." 
Neither MERS nor Residential was a party to the Stipulation. 
7. On October 7,2008, pursuant to the Stipulation, this Court entered the Default 
Judgment Against Julie G. Bamson Only (the "Bamson Judgment"). 
8. On October 9, 2008, ParkWest recorded the Bamson Judgment in the official 
records of Canyon County, Idaho. Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland filed concurrently herewith, 
~ 2, Exh. A. 
9. On July 9,2009, Homecomings foreclosed on the first MERS Deed of Trust and 
First American conveyed the Property to Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC 
("Residential") via Trustee's Deed. McFarland Aff., ~ 4, Exh. C. 
10. MERS, Residential, and ParkWest stipulated to Residential's intervention in this 
case on November 4, 2010. Second McFarland Aff., ~ 7, Exh. F. 
11. Residential filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Idaho Code section 
45-510, based on ParkWest's failure to name First American as a party defendant. 
12. On February 16, 2011, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision And Order 
(the "Memorandum :pecision"), unequivocally granting Residential's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
13. On March 1,2011, this Court entered Judgment in favor of Residential that 
Residential's interest "is, for all purposes, prior and senior to ParkWest's interest." 
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III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. This Court's Grant of Summary Judgment Was Correctly Granted And Is Founded 
On Deeply-Rooted Idaho Law. 
The Court granted Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the 
straightforward application ofIdaho law. Idaho Code section 45-510 provides that a mechanic's 
lien becomes void six months after it is filed unless "proceedings be commenced in a proper 
court within that time to enforce such lien." There is ample Idaho case law strictly construing 
that six-month deadline. See Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104,298 P.2d 972 (1956) (holding that 
a mechanic's lien is lost as to a property owner not timely named in a suit, even where the 
husband, a co-owner, is named in the lawsuit, because the six month time frame in which to 
foreclose a lien "is more than a mere statute of limitations which is waived if not pleaded; ... it 
is a limitation ... upon the right or liability itself; and ... the lien is lost as against the interest of 
any person not made a party to an action to enforce it within the six month period"); Palmer v. 
Bradford, 86 Idaho 395, 401,388 P.2d 96 (1963) (holding that ifIdaho Code section 45-510 is 
not complied with "no jurisdiction exists in the court to enforce the lien. When the limit fixed by 
statute for duration of the lien is past, no lien exists, any more than ifit had never been created"); 
Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 497, 501, 185 P. 554 (1919); 
D. W Standrod & Co. v. Utah Implement-Vehicle Co., 223 F. 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1915); 
Continental & Commercial Trust v. Pacific Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915); and 
Utah Implement-Vehicle Co. v. Bowman, 209 F. 942, 947-48 (D. Idaho 19l3). See also 
Weyyakin Ranch Property Owners' Ass 'n, Inc. v. City of Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1, 2-3, 896 P.2d 
327,328-29 (1995) (holding that the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over elected city 
officials where the plaintiffs "failed to name the elected officials individually"); and Collier 
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Carbon & Chemical Corp. v. Castle Butte, Inc., 109 Idaho 708, 710, 710 P.2d 618, 620 (Ct. App. 
1985) (holding that the trial court "lacked jurisdiction initially to enter ... judgment" against 
persons who were not named as defendants in their individual capacity in the complaint). 
Because under Idaho Code sections 45-1202 and 45-1513 a deed of trust is a conveyance 
of legal title to the trustee ofthe deed oftrust, the failure to name the trustee as a party defendant 
is fatal to a lien claimant's foreclosure action This is the universally recognized rule of law. See 
52 AM. JUR. 2D Mechanics' Liens § 369 (2010). See also Heyward & Lee Construction Co., 
Inc., v. Sands, Anderson, l11arks, & Miller, 249 Va. 54,58,453 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1995); Walt 
Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986); Riley v. Peters, 194 
Cal.App.2d 296, 15 Cal.Rptr. 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Lunsford v. Wren, 64 W.Va. 458, 63 S.E. 
308,311 (1908); Johnson v. Bennett, 6 Colo.App. 362,367,40 P. 847, 849 (Ct. App. 1895); 
Schillinger Fire-Proof Cement & Asphalt Co. v. Arnott, 14 N.Y.S. 326, 329 (N.Y. Spec. Term 
1891); and Columbia Building & Loan Ass 'no V. Taylor, 25 I1l.App. 429 (1887). 
Finally, Bonner Building Supply, Inc. V. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 
682 P.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1984) stands for the rule that while naming parties to a lien foreclosure 
action is optional, the upshot is that the interest of any unnamed party in the foreclosed property 
is "unaffected by the foreclosure," and the lien is "lost ... against the property in regard to" such 
unnamed parties. By application of this extensive and universal body oflaw, this Court correctly 
found that ParkWest's failure to name First American was fatal to ParkWest's Lien, as against 
First American and Residential: First American exercised its power of sale under the first MERS 
Deed of Trust and conveyed the Property, free and clear of Park West's Lien, to Residential. 
B. ParkWest's Interest In The Property Pursuant To The Barnson Judgment Was 
Never Senior To First American's Interest, And Was Eliminated By The Trustee's 
Sale To Residential. 
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In arguing for a reversal of the Judgment entered by this Court, ParkWest makes no effort 
to address the comprehensive body oflaw supporting the Court's decision, nor does ParkWest 
attempt to offer new evidence in support of its argument. Instead, ParkWest cavalierly 
disregards Idaho statute by arguing that ParkWest 's Judgment Lien relates back to, and is 
effective as of the date ParkWest allegedly began work on the property, prior to the date of the 
recording of the MERS Deeds of Trust. This argument is contrary to Idaho Code section 10-
1110, which states: 
A transcript or abstract of any judgment or decree of any court of 
this state ... certified by the clerk having custody thereof, may be 
recorded 'IV ith the recorder of any county of this state, who shall 
immediately record and docket the same as by law provided, and 
from the time of such recordi11g, and not before, the judgment so 
recorded becomes a lien upon all real property of the judgment 
debtor in the county 
(emphasis added). Judgment liens are creatures of statute: absent this statute, ParkWest would 
not have had ajudgment lien at all, and the plain reading of the statute makes that lien effective 
only from the time of the recording of the judgment lien and not before. The MERS Deeds of 
Trust were recorded November 14,2006. The Bamson Judgment was entered October 7, 2008, 
and was recorded October 9,2008, nearly two years after the MERS Deeds of Trust. By the 
plain language of Idaho Code section 10-1110, "ParkWest's Judgment Lien" canl10t relate back 
to when ParkWest allegedly started work on the Property and is not prior to the MERS Deeds of 
Trust. 
Idaho's recording laws also reject ParkWest's position. Idaho Code section 55-606 
provides that 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is 
conclusive against the grantor, also against everyone subsequently 
claiming under him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in 
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good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien 
by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded. 
(emphasis added). The statute clearly makes judgment liens subject to the traditional recording 
laws: judgment liens, like other conveyances (under Idaho Code section 45-1513, a deed of trust 
is expressly defined as a "conveyance ofreal property"), have priority only as of the date they 
are recorded. It follows that a judgment takes priority over a conveyance only when the 
judgment has been entered by the Court and then recorded in the real property records prior to 
the conveyance. First Nat. Bank of Lewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P. 287 (1900). A 
judgment lien is eliminated as to particular property, therefore, by the foreclosure of a 
previously-recorded (i.e., senior) mortgage or deed of trust. Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight, 
92 Idaho 210, 440 P.2d 143 (1968). 
The case law cited by ParkWest - even the precise language quoted by ParkWest stands 
for the proposition that a judgment lien is effective only as of the date it is recorded: 
• Parkwest cites Fulton v. Duro, 107 Idaho 240,687 P.2d 1367 (Ct. App. 1984) for 
the Court of Appeals' treatment of Hays. In the language quoted by ParkWest, the Court in Hays 
held, and Fulton confirmed, that with respect to judgment liens: 
Thejudgmel1t [becomes] a lien 011 said land 011 the date of its 
entry . .. and the sheriff s deed [produced in connection with the 
foreclosure of the judgment lien] by relation dated back to the date 
when the lien of said judgment attached to said land, and cut off all 
subsequent liens. 
Fulton, 687 P.2d at 1373 (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language quoted by ParkWest 
establishes that the Bamson Judgment became a lien only as of the date of its entry, not before. 
• ParkWest's citation to PNC Bank v. Kelepecz, 289 Conn. 692,960 A.2d 563 
(2008) clarifies that a judgment lien does not take priority over a previously-recorded 
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encumbrance. The owner of the property at issue, and eventual judgment debtor, executed a 
mortgage against the property which was recorded in 1987; in 1992, the plaintiff obtained a 
judgment against the property owner and recorded that judgment as a lien in 1992; then in 1996, 
the property owner recorded two additional mortgages against the property. Id., 960 A.2d at 565. 
Thereafter, "the trial court determined that the [1986] mortgage was first in priority on the 
property .... It further concluded that [the] judgment lien was second in priority .... The trial 
court further determined that [the first-recorded 1996] mortgage was third in priority." Id., at 
566. The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's findings. !d. at 573. 
Also relevant to this instant case was the Connecticut court's note that "the right to file a 
valid judgment lien is wholly a creature of the statute. The conditions precedent to the validity 
of such a lien are all prescribed by statute." !d., at 568. So it is in Idaho: under Idaho Code 
section 10-1110, a judgment constitutes a lien on real property only "from the time of such 
recording, and not before." 
• ParkWest's citation to United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank a/San 
Diego, 71 S.Ct. 111,340 U.S. 47 (1950) is similarly unavailing. In that case, the judgment 
debtor had mortgages recorded against his property, a later federal tax lien recorded in 1946, and 
ajudgment lien recorded in 1947. The Supreme Court ruled that the mortgages were entitled to 
first priority, the federal tax lien to secondary priority, and the last-recorded judgment lien was 
relegated to the most junior priority position. Id. Similarly here, ParkWest'sjudgment lien does 
not take priority over the previously-recorded MERS Deeds of Trust. 
• ParkWest's citation to First Mid-Illinois Bank & Trust v. Parker, 403 Ill.App.3d 
784, 933 N.E.2d 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) is inapplicable because it involves the priorities of 
competing judgment creditors. Perhaps the only lesson to be drawn from that case is the Illinois 
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Court's recognition ofthe principal that "generally, a lien that is first in time has priority and is 
entitled to prior satisfaction out of the property it binds." So here: the MERS Deeds of Trust 
were first in time vis-a.-vis, and so have priority over, ParkWest's Bamson Judgment lien. 
• People's Bankv. Bilmor Building Corp., 28 Conn.App. 809,614 A.2d 456 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 1992), cited by ParkWest, is also inapplicable: it involves a mortgage (recorded in 
1989), a pre-judgment writ of attachment (recorded in 1991), and a subsequent judgment lien. 
Id. Pursuant to strict statutory interpretation, the Connecticut court held that the judgment lien 
related back to the date of the pre-judgment writ of attachment; however, the Court did not find 
that the pre-judgment writ of attachment was prior to the earlier-recorded mortgage. That case 
has no bearing on this case: ParkWest did not file a pre-judgment writ of attachment under 
Idaho Code section 8-501, et seq., and ParkWest has not offered this Court any case or statute 
supporting the argument that a mechanic's lien should be treated as a pre-judgment writ of 
attachment. 
Idaho law expressly rejects the idea that prejudgment writs of attachments may issue in 
cases where a mechanic's lien secures an alleged debt: in Heinrich v. Barlow, 87 Idaho 72, 390 
P .2d 831 (1964), plaintiff, "[ u ]pon the filing of the complaint ... filed his affidavit for [pre-
judgment] attachment, stating in substance that the defendants ... were indebted to plaintiffs 
upon two contracts for the direct payment of money." Id., 390 P.2d at 832. Analyzing the 
"question as to whether appellants, at the time of the attachment, were secured within the 
meaning of!. C. §§ 8-501,8-502," the Court held that: 
The remedy by attachment is purely statutory and summary and a 
party must, in order to have the benefit of this statutory process do 
everything required by the authorizing statutes. The claim, 
therefore, must be one founded upon a contract for the direct 
payment of money, the payment of which has not been secured in 
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any degree by any of the means specified in the statute. If it has 
been so secured, however inadequately, attachment cannot issue, 
unless such security has, without any act of the plaintiff, or the 
person to whom the security was given, become valueless. 
Id. at 835-36 (emphasis added). 
• Similarly, ParkWest's citation to BNC Mortgage, Inc. v. Tax Pros., Inc., 111 
Wash.App. 238,46 P.3d 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) supports a finding that the MERS Deeds of 
Trust, recorded prior to the Bamson Judgment, are prior in interest. In that case, the defendant 
had recorded a pre-judgment writ of attachment against the debtor's property, pursuant to statute, 
in 1994; then in 1996, the plaintiff recorded a deed of trust; and then in 1999 the defendant 
obtained a judgment. Id. 46 P.3d at 817. The issue was "whether the 1999 judgment relate[d] 
back" to the 1994 attachment. !d. at 818. In analyzing that issue, the Washington court 
compared deeds of trust and judgment liens, citing the principal that is controlling here: "A 
judgment creates a lien against real estate in each county where the judgment is recorded. A 
deed of trust creates a lien against the property it describes. The lien first in time is the lien first 
in right." Id. at 817. Thus, regardless of the nature of the lien - whether a judgment lien or a 
deed of trust - the first recorded lien takes priority.! 
• ParkWest then cites to JI Kislak Mortgage Corp. of Delaware v. William 
Matthews Builder, Inc., 287 A.2d 686 (Del. 1972), Rainbow Trust v. Moulton Construction, Inc., 
1 While the Court ultimately found that the later-recorded judgment lien was prior to the previously recorded deed 
of trust, that fmding was not a refutation of this principal because the Court's conclusion was based on application 
of the plain language of the Washington statute regarding pre-judgment attachment. BNe Mortgage, 46 P.3d at 
818. The judgment lien related back to the date of the pre-judgment attachment, which was recorded before the 
deed of trust. This case does not involve a pre-judgment writ of attachment, and mechanic's liens are not entitled 
to the treatment afforded to pre-judgment writs of attachments, both of which are creatures of statute. Even if it 
was entitled to the same treatment, the mechanic's lien was recorded after the MERS Deeds of Trust, so that the 
Bamson Judgment lien still would not relate back prior to the MERS Deeds of Trust. 
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200 B.R. 785 (Bankr. D. Vet. 1996), and Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, No. 36523, 
2010 WL 5186706 (Idaho Dec. 23, 2010), for the proposition that a mechanic's lien attaches as 
of the date work commenced. Residential does not challenge this principal - which is codified in 
Idaho Code section 45-506 (see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 94 
Idaho 489, 492, 491 P.2d 1261, 1264 (1971»; however, Residential rejects, as does Idaho law, 
ParkWest's argument that a Judgment Lien attaches as of the date the mechanic's lien attaches. 
That argument is not only unsupported, but contrary to statute as cited herein and contrary to the 
case law cited by ParkWest. 
Given this clear statute and case law, there is simply no basis in law for ParkWest's 
argument that the Bamson Judgment constitutes a lien prior in right to First American's, and now 
Residential's, interest in the Property. 
Next, ParkWest argues that the interest in property ofa trustee ofa deed of trust is 
subject to divestiture as a result of subsequent legal proceedings against the grantor of the deed 
of trust. This argument is not only unsupported by the law, but contrary to common sense: the 
interest of a trustee in a deed of trust is a property right, and it would be a due process violation 
for that right to be divested in judicial proceedings to which the trustee was not a party. That is 
the whole thrust of the law supporting this Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Residential: a person, including a trustee of a deed of trust, cannot be deprived of property rights 
without due process of law, which fundamentally requires that the trustee be a party to legal 
proceedings that might affect such property rights. 
Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) does not stand for the 
proposition that a trustee may be deprived of its property rights without due process - as 
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ParkWest's own explanation of Long establishes. The facts at play in Long, as identified by 
ParkWest, were: 
1. Williams owned property subject to a deed of trust with Avco as beneficiary. Id., 
671 P.2dat 1049; 
2. When Williams filed bankruptcy, Williams' right to the property was passed to 
the bankruptcy trustee by operation of the bankruptcy laws. Id.; 
3. During the administration of the estate, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed the 
property to Avco, the beneficiary of the deed of trust. Id.; 
4. Thereafter, A vco instructed the trustee to reconvey the deed of trust. Id.; 
5. Avco then conveyed fee simple title, free and clear of the then-reconveyed deed 
oftrust, to Long. !d. 
The bankruptcy trustee's conveyance of the Property vested fee simple title in Avco. The deed 
of trust - along with any interest of the trustee - ceased to exist upon the reconveyance of the 
deed oftrust. 
Williams later sued claiming that he held title to the property senior in right to Long 
under the twisted theory that because, prior to the bankruptcy, he (Williams) held title to the 
property subject to the Avco deed of trust, the bankruptcy trustee had no power to convey the 
property. !d. at 1050. The Supreme Court rejected Williams' argument, holding that: 
At the time Williams filed his petition in bankruptcy ... Lewis 
County Abstract Company [trustee of the Avco deed oftrust] held 
nothing more than the power of sale upon the happening of certain 
contingencies .... 
The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed all legal and equitable interests 
of Williams in the subject property to Avco. Avco's interest as 
beneficiary under the Deed of Trust merged with this purchased 
interest. 
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Id. at 1051. The trustee never exercised its power of sale because A vco' s interest in the property 
merged with the deed oftrust and the deed of trust was reconveyed before the trustee exercised 
its power of sale. Neither Avco's nor the trustee of the Avco deed of trust's rights were taken 
from them without due process: Avco received fee simple title to the property, at which case 
there was no need for a deed of trust to preserve A vco' s interest in the property, and so the deed 
of trust was reconveyed. 
The facts in this instant case are very different: MERS' interest in the Property never 
merged with its interest in the Deed of Trust, and First American was never authorized to 
reconvey the MERS Deeds of Trust. Instead, the "happening of certain contingencies" (i.e., 
Barnson's default of the MERS Deeds of Trust) occurred, and First American exercised its 
power of sale under the First MERS Deed of Trust. 
IfParkWest's argument were followed, property owners would be at liberty to collude 
with any purported mechanic's lien claimant to strip lenders with deeds oftrust or mortgages on 
real property of their legal and contractual rights. Consider: a property owner who received a 
loan secured by real property, but who no longer desires her land to be burdened with an 
encumbrance, could collude with a purported - even fictitious - mechanic's lien claimant, allow 
a default judgment to be entered (as Barnson has done with ParkWest here), and then use that 
judgment to strip the lender of its interest in the formerly-encumbered property. That technique 
could be used by anyone, regardless of the lack of merit to the purported mechanic's lien - even 
an abjectly fraudulent claim could strip a lender of its rights. Under ParkWest's argument, the 
lender would not need to be named in the lawsuit and would not even learn of the suit until after 
the judgment had been entered and the "lien claimant" had obtained a senior interest in the 
property. 
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This is the very result that the body of case law relied on by the Court in reaching its 
judgment in this case is designed to avoid. It is precisely what the Idaho Court of Appeals was 
guarding against when it held, in Bonner Building Supply, Inc., that: 
I.C. § 45-1202 does not enable a materialman to foreclose a lien as 
against other interested parties without giving them notice of the 
proceedings. 
Therefore, although Bonner was not required to name Standard as 
a party to the foreclose action ... the failure to do so left Standards' 
interest in the property unaffected by the foreclosure. Because 
Bonner failed to foreclose against Standard within six months of 
the filing of its claim of lien, it lost its lien against the property in 
regard to Standard. 
Bonner Building Supply, Inc., 682 P.2d at 639. Due process protects against exactly the kind of 
thing ParkWest urges for now. ParkWest's argument finds no support in the law, and should be 
rejected. 
Finally, ParkWest repeats its argument that the only power a trustee of a deed of trust 
possesses is a power of sale; however, ParkWest inexplicably jumps from that premise to the 
argument that Residential acquired all other attributes of ownership through Barnson. Like 
ParkWest's other arguments, that argument is directly contrary to Idaho statute and directly 
contrary to Long v. Williams, on which ParkWest so heavily relies. Idaho Code sections 45-1508 
and 45-1506 expressly state that "A sale made by a trustee ... shall foreclose and terminate all 
interest in the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom notice is given," 
including "The grantor in the trust deed," and "Any person having a lien or interest subsequent to 
the interest of the trustee in the trust deed where such lien or interest appears of record." 
Therefore, once the trustee has executed its power of sale under the deed of trust, the rights of the 
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"grantor in the trust deed" are foreclosed, and all rights, powers, and attributes of ownership are 
transferred by the trustee to the transferee - in this case, by First American to Residential. 
Long v. Williams itself refutes ParkWest's nonsensical argument. In the most critical 
passage of the opinion not quoted by ParkWest, the Supreme Court states: 
[L ]egal title is conveyed [via a deed of trust] solely for the purpose 
of security, leaving in the trustor or his successors a legal estate in 
the property, as against all persons except the trustees and those 
lawfully claiming under them. Except as to the trustees and 
those holding under them, the trustor or his successor is treated by 
our law as the holder of the legal title. The legal estate thus left in 
the trustor or his successors entitles them to the possession of the 
property until their rights have been fully divested by a 
conveyance made by the trustees in the lawful execution of their 
trust, and entitles them to exercise all the ordinary incidents of 
ownership, in regard to the property, subject always, of course, to 
the execution of the trust. 
Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that all attributes of ownership of property 
subject to a deed of trust are precisely that: held by the owner subject to the trustee. 
ParkWest's citation to Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312,824 P.2d 887 (1991) 
supports this rule. In Willis, the property owner defaulted on the deed of trust. The beneficiary 
then commenced foreclosure proceedings, but before those proceedings were completed the 
beneficiary entered into negotiations with a third party to assign her rights in the deed of trust 
and entered the property, changed the locks, and stripped the property of appliances, fixtures, and 
furnishings, damaging the property in the process. Id. 824 P.2d at 889. The Court noted that the 
grantor of a deed of trust retains the right of possession and all incidents of ownership of the 
property, except "in the event a/the grantor's default on the underlying obligation." Here, as 
in Willis, the exception applied: because Barnson had defaulted on the deed of trust, First 
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American had the right to convey, as it did to Residential, fee simple title, including the right of 
possession and all incidents of ownership. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, MERS requests that this Court deny ParkWest's Motion 
For Reconsideration And Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment. 
Uqy DATED THIS day of March, 2011. 
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HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company, 
DefendantiCounterclaimant. 
------------------------------
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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) 
) 
) 
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Ryan T. McFarland, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am counsel for Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC in the 
foregoing action and make this affidavit on my own personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Default Judgment 
Against Julie G. Bamson Only, recorded in the real property records of Canyon County, Idaho 
on October 9,2008. 
3. Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Teri French, a Notary Public, do hereby certify that on.this z..~bdday of March, 2011, 
personally appeared before me Ryan T. McFarland, who, being by me first duly sworn, declared 
that he is an attorney of record for Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC in 
the foregoing action, that he signed the foregoing document as an attorney for Defendant 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, and that the statements therein contained are 
true. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires June 27,2014 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this V'/;~ day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Robert B. Bums 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney at Law 
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701-0837 
[Attorney for Defendant Julie G. Barnson] 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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__ Overnight Mail 
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__ Telecopy 
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E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
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Robert B. Bums, ISB No. 3744 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd .• 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
rbb@rnoffatt.com 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Ij 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, as nominee for 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (fi'k/a 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a 
Delaware limited liability company; and 
DOES 1-10; 
Defendants. 
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DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 
JULIE G. BARNSON ONLY 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court wherein: (a) PlaintiffParkWest 
Homes LLC ("ParkWest") filed (i) its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien on August 7, 2007, 
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(ii) its First Amended Verified Complaint to Forec1ose Lien on September 12, 2007, and (iii) its 
Second Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien on September 4, 2008 (the "SAC"); (b) attorney 
David E. Wisbney filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Defendant Julie G. Bamson 
("Bamson") dated August 31, 2007; (c) cOlmsel for ParkWest and Bamson have now filed on 
behalf of their respective clients a Stipulation for Entry of Default Judgment, by which, inter 
alia, Bamson consented to the filing of the SAC and the entry of default judgment in ParkWest's 
favor against Bamson, provided no award for damages was taken against Bamson personally; 
and (d) by reason of the foregoing matters, ParkWest is entitled to judgment against Bamson as 
requested in the SAC; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. For purposes of this Judgment, and when referred to hereafter, the term 
"Property" shall mean that certain real property located at 28123 Silo Way, Wilder, Idaho, and 
more particularly described as follows: Lot 4 in Block 1 of Riverbend Subdivision, according to 
the official plat thereof, filed in Book 34 of Plats at Page 2, Official Records of Canyon County, 
Idaho. 
2. ParkWest shall have judgment against Bamson to the extent of her interest 
in the Property, but not personally, for the following amounts as pled in the SAC: $141,208.39 
for the amount owed to ParkWest as of November 28,2006, with respect to its construction of 
improvements to the Property; prejudgment interest at the agreed rate of 18% per annum, or 
$69.64 per diem, from November 28,2006, through the date of entry of this Judgment; and 
$33,000.00 for the costs of perfecting and enforcing ParkWest's lien, costs of suit, and 
reasonable attorney fees. 
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3. Jurisdiction over this cause is hereby expressly reserved and retained for 
the purpose of making such further orders as may be necessary in order to carry this Judgment 
into effect and as may be necessary or desirable. 
4. This Judgment shall be considered to be a final judgment against Bamson 
and is intended to constitute the final judgment against her in this action. 
DATED this ~ day of __ n,-'-...L.!=c::r;~~=:>..r::>oC>..-_ 2008. 
GORDON W. PETRIE 
District Judge 
WILUA ~. Court 
By' 
.... 
'. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of September 2008, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST .JULIE G. BARNSON 
ONLY to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Stephen C. Hardesty 
Ryan T. McFarland 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP 
877 W. Main St., Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Facsimile (208) 342-3829 
David E. Wishney 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LA W 
300 W. Myrtle, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile (208) 342-5749 
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(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Client1011132.1 
Page:40f5 
'Srancll :;r AD,User :D016 Station In :DK4E 
" . 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of <0 ~1 2008, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 
JULIE G. BAR..l'~'SON ONLY to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Stephen C. Hardesty 
Ryan T. McFarland 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 W. Main St., Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Facsimile (208) 342-3829 
David E. Wishney 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
300 W. Myrtle, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile (208) 342-5749 
Robert B. Bums 
MOFFATT, THOMAS. BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise. ID 83701 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
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Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
rbb@moffatt.com 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAR 28 2011 
CANYON COUN1Y CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, as nominee for 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/k/a 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a 
Delaware limited liability company; and 
DOES 1-10; 
Defendants, 
and 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company, 
Defendant/Intervenor. 
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OF (i) MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
(ii) MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") does 
not dispute any of the following contentions argued by Plaintiff Park West Homes LLC 
("ParkWest") in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of (i) Motion for Reconsideration and 
(ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("ParkWest's Memorandum"), filed March 7, 2011: 
• That ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the property at issue (the 
"Property") on May 18, 2006-a date six months before MERS 1 recorded its two deeds of trust 
against the Property.2 ParkWest's Memorandum 6-7. 
• That ParkWest's judgment against the owner's interest in the Property (the 
"Bamson Judgment") became final not later than January 26, 2009-a date six months prior to 
Residential's acquisition of the Property. ParkWest's Memorandum 3 n.!. 
• That both the fact and effect of the Barnson Judgment were put squarely at 
issue in this lawsuit by ParkWest's Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien, filed 
September 14,2010. ParkWest's Memorandum 4. 
Moreover, in its opposition Residential admits that the Bamson Judgment was 
recorded against the Property on October 9, 2008-a date nine months prior to Residential's 
acquisition ofthe Property. Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Defendant Residential 
Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("McFarland Aff."), filed March 23,2011, at ~ 2 and Ex. A. 
1 I.e., Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"). 
2 See Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Residential's 
Opposition"), filed March 23, 2011, at 12 ("Residential does not challenge this principal 
[sic] ... "). 
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Accordingly, there is no question in this dispute that the lien of the Bamson 
Judgment is at issue in this lawsuit and that Residential had constructive notice of the Barnson 
Judgment when Residential purchased the Property.3 Rather, the question here presented is 
whether the trustee under MERS' two deeds of trust, First American Title Insurance Company 
("First American"), could convey the Property to Residential free and clear of the lien 
established by the recorded Bamson Judgment ("ParkWest's Judgment Lien"). Or otherwise 
stated, Residential contends that although ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the Property 
six months before MERS recorded its two deeds of trust-and was therefore senior in priority to 
any interest in the Property granted by the deeds oftrust-ParkWest lost the priority of its 
mechanic's lien by perfecting it through entry of the Bamson Judgment. 
The argument is without legal basis, for the reasons discussed below. 
II. ARGUMENT 
The question of whether First American could convey the Property to Residential 
free and clear of Park West's Judgment Lien cannot be answered without first determining the 
interests in the Property held, respectively, by First American and Defendant Julie Barnson 
("Bamson") at the time First American executed its trustee's sale of the Property. The several 
sub-issues necessary to properly determine the respective interests of Bamson and First 
American as of that sale are set forth below, followed by a rebuttal of the policy arguments 
raised by Residential. 
3 See Idaho Code § 55-801 ("Any ... judgment affecting the title to or possession of real 
property may be recorded ... ") and Idaho Code § 55-811 ("Every conveyance ... recorded as 
prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice of 
the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers ... "). 
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A. Any Interest in the Property Held by First American Was Subject to 
ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien. 
As noted above, Residential concedes that the mechanic's lien claimed by 
Park West attached to the Property six months before MERS recorded its two deeds of trust 
against the Property. Accordingly, because the interest in the Property of Bamson was 
encumbered by ParkWest's mechanic's lien prior to Bamson's grant ofMERS' two deeds of 
trust, any interest in the Property conveyed by Barnson under the two deeds of trust was also 
subject to ParkWest's mechanic's lien. 
In this regard, both common sense and statute dictate that First American could 
convey no more to Residential than Bamson, as the grantor of MERS , two deeds of trust, could 
herself convey. Thus, Idaho Code Section 45-1506(10) provides: 
The trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest 
in the property which the grantor had, or had the power to convey, 
at the time of the execution by him of the trust deed together with 
any interest the grantor or his successors in interest acquired after 
the execution of such trust deed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
B. Barnson Had the Right Under Idaho Law to Stipulate to the Terms of the 
Barnson Judgment. 
Neither Residential nor MERS has at any time challenged Bamson's right under 
Idaho law to settle with ParkWest by stipulating to the entry of the Bamson Judgment, which by 
its express terms awarded ParkWest "judgment against Barnson to the extent of her interest in 
the Property .... " McFarland Aff. Ex. A, at 2 ~ 2. Thus, it is only the effect, and not the fact, of 
the Bamson Judgment that is here at issue. 
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C. ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien Encumbering Barnson's Interest in the 
Property Was Merged into the Barnson Judgment. 
The general rule with respect to the merger of an inchoate claim into a final 
judgment is summarized in American Jurisprudence 2d as follows: 
As a general rule, when a valid final judgment is rendered, 
the original debt or cause of action, or underlying obligation upon 
which an adjudication is predicated, merges into the judgment. 
The original claim is extinguished and a new cause of action on a 
judgment is substituted for it. ... [f1 It is immaterial whether the 
judgment is rendered upon a verdict; or upon a motion to dismiss 
or other objection to the pleadings; or upon consent, confession, or 
default. 
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 458 (2006) (multiple footnotes omitted; emphasis added). 
Accordingly, when the Bamson Judgment became final six months prior to 
Residential's acquisition of the Property, ParkWest's mechanic's lien encumbering Bamson's 
interest in the Property was merged into the Bamson Judgment and thereby extinguished. 
D. The Priority of ParkWest's Judgment Lien Relates Back to, and Is 
Established by, the Priority of Park West's Mechanic's Lien. 
Because the Barnson Judgment was recorded against the Property after MERS' 
two deeds of trust were recorded, Residential argues that First American's interest in the 
Property had priority over ParkWest's Judgment Lien. See Residential's Opposition 8 ("It 
follows that a judgment takes priority over a conveyance only when the judgment has been 
entered by the Court and then recorded in the real property records prior to the conveyance. "). 
Or put otherwise, Residential contends that although ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the 
Property six months before MERS recorded its two deeds of trust, ParkWest lost the priority of 
its mechanic's lien by perfecting it through entry of the Bamson Judgment. The established law 
with respect to the effect of final judgments is contra. 
As also explained in American Jurisprudence 2d: 
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A lien securing a debt which becomes merged in a 
judgment generally is not affected by such merger. If a debt is of 
such a character that a lien is given by common law or statute, the 
merger of the judgment does not involve a merger of the lien and 
the latter may continue until the debt is satisfied. An assignment 
or lien securing a debt which becomes merged in a judgment is not 
affected by the merger; the merger does not destroy the character 
of the debt. If a creditor has a lien upon property of the debtor 
and obtains a judgment against the debtor, the creditor does not 
thereby lose the benefit of the lien. The judgment only changes the 
form of the action for recovery. The creditor retains the right to 
enforce a lien or gain possession of property held as collateral for 
the debt. The reason for this rule is to avoid the obvious injustice 
of forcing the assignee or lien holder to lose its security preference 
by pursuing its claim to judgment. 
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 462 (2006) (multiple footnotes omitted; emphasis added). The 
foregoing legal principles are supported by a multitude of authorities cited in the omitted 
footnotes. 4 
Therefore, as previously argued in ParkWest's Memorandum, the priority of 
ParkWest's Judgment Lien relates back to, and is established by, the priority of Park West's 
mechanic's lien-which is a date six months before MERS recorded its two deeds of trust 
against the Property. 
4 ParkWest concurs with Residential's argument that, by application ofIdaho Code 
Section 10-1110, ParkWest's Judgment Lien became a lien on the Property upon recordation of 
the Bamson Judgment. Residential's Memorandum 7. However, the question of when 
ParkWest's Judgment Lien first attached to the Property is distinct from the question of whether 
the priority of Park West's Judgment Lien relates back to, and is established by, the priority of 
ParkWest's mechanic's lien. Residential, of course, cites no case or secondary authority 
supporting its argument that '''ParkWest's Judgment Lien' cannot relate back to when ParkWest 
allegedly started work on the Property .... " Id (emphasis in original). 
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E. Residential Acquired the Property Subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien. 
The fact that First American could not convey the Property free and clear of 
ParkWest's Judgment Lien is established by the decision in Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 
671 P.2d 1048 (1983), where our Supreme Court held as follows: 
We hold that the deed of trust conveys to the trustee 
nothing more than a power of sale, capable of exercise upon the 
occurrence of certain contingencies (such as default in payment) 
and leaves in the trustor a legal estate comprised of all incidents of 
ownership .... 
Id. at 586,671 P.2d at 1049 (emphasis added). And then further held: 
Therefore, we hold that, even though title passes for the purpose of 
the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage 
with power of sale. 
Id. at 587-88,671 P.2d at 1050-51.5 
The opinion in Long is fully summarized in ParkWest's Memorandum at 
pages 7-9, but the essence of the case is as follows: 
1. The grantor ofthe deed of trust conveyed title to the trustee before filing 
bankruptcy; 
5 Accord Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 824 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1991): 
Under the rule at common law, a deed of trust places legal title to 
the property in the trustee. Under Idaho law, a deed of trust is a 
mortgage with a power of sale; the legal title is conveyed to the 
trustee solely for the purpose of security. The deed of trust leaves 
in the grantor a legal estate which entitles the grantor to possession 
of the property and all incidents of ownership; the exception to this 
is the trustee's power to sell the property in the event of the 
grantor's default on the underlying obligation. See Long v. 
Williams .. .. 
Id. at 314 n.2, 824 P.2d at 889 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added). 
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2. After the grantor filed bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed all 
remaining interests of the grantor in the subject property to the beneficiary 
under the deed of trust; 
3. The trustee under the deed of trust later reconveyed title to the grantor; 
and 
4. Our Supreme Court held that the trustee's deed to the grantor was without 
legal effect, as the trustee's title had been divested as a matter oflaw 
wholly without involvement by the trustee in the bankruptcy proceedings.6 
Thus, the decision in Long unequivocally establishes that the interest in property a trustee under 
a deed of trust can convey is subject to divestiture as a result of subsequent legal proceedings 
involving solely the grantor of the deed of trust. 7 
6 Or as our Supreme Court explained: 
The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed all legal and equitable 
interests of Williams in the subject property to Avco. Avco's 
interest as beneficiary under the Deed of Trust merged with this 
purchased interest. Thus, A vco was the owner of the property and 
entitled to possession subject only to the satisfaction of the 
homestead interest of Williams and to Long's inferior judgment 
lien. Consequently, when Lewis County Abstract executed the 
Deed of Reconveyance, it conveyed no interest. 
Id. at 588, 671 P.2d at 1051 (emphasis added). (Obviously if a trustee under a deed of trust holds 
a property interest in encumbered property and not merely a power of sale, as Residential 
contends in this dispute, Lewis County Abstract's property interest could not have been 
conveyed by the trustee in Williams' bankruptcy and Lewis County Abstract's subsequent deed 
of reconveyance would have conveyed such property interest back to Williams.) 
7 Residential seeks to distinguish Long by pointing out that there no trustee's sale ever 
occurred. See Residential's Memorandum 15-16 (first stating that "once the trustee has executed 
its power of sale [emphasis added] under the deed of trust, the rights ofthe 'grantor in the trust 
deed' are foreclosed," and then quoting our Supreme Court's quotation of Bank of Italy Nat 'I 
Trust & Savings Ass 'n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940,944-45 (Cal. 1933)). Although Residential 
asserts the quoted material on which it relies is "the most critical passage of the opinion" in 
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Based on the points and authorities discussed previously, there is no question that 
Barnson could not convey her interest in the Property by the two deeds of trust she granted free 
and clear of the mechanic's lien claimed by ParkWest, or that the trustee under these deeds of 
trust did not acquire title to the Property before ParkWest's mechanic's lien had attached. 
Neither First American nor its predecessor trustee, therefore, ever held title before ParkWest's 
lien had already attached to the Property. The question therefore becomes whether the interest in 
the Property First American could convey was subject to the merger of Park West's inchoate 
claim to a mechanic's lien into the Bamson Judgment. The decision in Long establishes that it 
was. 
Accordingly, when First American executed its power of sale and deeded the 
Property to Residential, Residential acquired the Property encumbered by Park West's Judgment 
Lien. 
F. Residential's Policy Arguments for Disregarding ParkWest's Judgment Lien 
Are Without Merit. 
Wholly ignoring the holding in Long that a "deed of trust conveys to the trustee 
nothing more than a power of sale," Residential argues: 
the interest of a trustee in a deed of trust is a property right, and it 
would be a due process violation for that right to be divested in 
judicial proceedings to which the trustee was not a party. That is 
the whole thrust of the law supporting this Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Residential: a person, including a 
trustee of a deed of trust, cannot be deprived of property rights 
Long, the quotation is to the law of California and not included within the stated holdings in 
Long-a fact Residential fails to disclose. Residential has also deleted the references in the 
quoted material to the California statutes and case law on which this "most critical passage" is 
based, thereby further obfuscating the fact that the quoted material relates to the law of 
California, not Idaho. Moreover, the attempted distinction is without legal substance for the 
elemental reason that the Barnson Judgment was entered long prior to the date First American 
executed its power of sale, while Bamson still held "all incidents of ownership .... " 
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without due process of law, which fundamentally requires that the 
trustee be a party to legal proceedings that might affect such 
property rights. 
Residential's Memorandum 12. 
But, of course, not only did our Supreme Court hold in Long that, "even though 
title passes for the purpose of the trust," the trustee obtains "nothing more than a power of sale," 
but the decision in Long established that the interest in property a trustee can convey is subject to 
divestiture as a result of legal proceeding not involving the trustee.8 Moreover, Residential cites 
no authority whatsoever in support of its contention that First American held a property right 
under Idaho law that was subject to due-process protections. 
Residential next argues: 
IfParkWest's argument were followed, property owners 
would be at liberty to collude with any purported mechanic's lien 
claimant to strip lenders with deeds of trust or mortgages on real 
property of their legal and contractual rights. Consider: a 
property owner who received a loan secured by real property, but 
who no longer desires her land to be burdened with an 
encumbrance, could collude with a purported - even fictitious -
mechanic's lien claimant, allow a default judgment to be entered 
(as Barnson has done with ParkWest here), and then use that 
judgment to strip the lender of its interest in the formerly-
encumbered property. That technique could be used by anyone, 
regardless ofthe lack of merit to the purported mechanic's lien-
even an abjectly fraudulent claim could strip a lender of its rights. 
Under ParkWest's argument, the lender would not need to be 
named in the lawsuit and would not even learn of the suit until 
after the judgment had been entered and the "lien claimant" had 
obtained a senior interest in the property. 
Residential's Memorandum 14. 
8 See note 6 supra. 
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The foregoing argument is a red herring for the following elemental reasons: 
• First - and most importantly - because a mortgage lien is unquestionably a 
property interest subject to due-process protections, the Bamson Judgment would have had no 
adverse effect on MERS' liens under its two deeds of trust so long as MERS retained its liens 
and contested the amount of the Barnson Judgment in this lawsuit. 
• Second, after the Bamson Judgment was entered, MERS could have 
judicially foreclosed the liens under its two deeds of trust in this lawsuit, rather than effecting a 
trustee's sale during the pendency of this lawsuit. 
• Third, because MERS has since the beginning of this lawsuit been a party 
defendant and the lender's nominee designated to protect the lender's interests under MERS' two 
deeds of trust, the interests ofMERS and the lender have at all times been defended by counsel 
of their choice. 
• Fourth, neither MERS nor Residential has made any contention in this 
lawsuit that Barnson in fact did anything wrong in settling ParkWest's claim by stipulating to the 
terms of the Barnson Judgment. 
• Fifth, MERS had the right to challenge the Barnson Judgment when first 
entered under I.R.C.P. 59(e) and then under I.R.C.P. 60(b) prior to MERS' dismissal, and 
Residential still has the right under I.R.C.P. 60(b) to challenge the Bamson Judgment under 
certain grounds, including for fraud upon the court. 
• Sixth, the same protections afforded MERS and Residential under our 
foreclosure laws and civil rules just referenced are equally applicable to all lenders and 
purchasers of real property in other instances. 
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• Seventh, absolutely no challenge to the Barnson Judgment has been made 
by MERS, Residential, or Bamson herself-who is being sued for the amount of Park West's 
recovery in this lawsuit by the title insurance company that insured the priority of MERS' two 
deeds of trust without bothering to ask ParkWest whether it had been paid for its work. 
Finally, the Court should note that Residential, which as a matter of law had 
constructive notice of Park West's Judgment Lien, almost certainly had actual notice of the lien 
as well. Therefore, Residential almost equally as certainly would have paid a sweetheart price 
for the Property at First American's trustee's sale. Under these circumstances there can be no 
surprise hardship claimed by Residential by reason of its failure to stiff Park West for the 
reasonable value of its work in building Barnson's house, as Residential acquired precisely what 
it thought it was buying: the Property encumbered by ParkWest's Judgment Lien. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, together with those argued in 
ParkWest's Memorandum, ParkWest respectfully requests the Court to reconsider the 
memorandum decision it entered in this case and then alter and amend the judgment to provide 
that Residential's interest in the Property is held subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien. 
DATED this 28th day of March 2011. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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In accordance with the Court's invitation to do so extended at the March 30, 2011, 
hearing in this matter (the "Hearing"). PlaintiffParkWest Homes LLC (HParkWest") hereby 
submits its supplemental authority and argument in support of its pending motions for 
reconsideration and to alter or amend the judgment entered by the Court. 
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction to Reconsider Its Memorandum Decision and 
Alter or Amend Its Judgment Based on the New Issues Presented by 
ParkWest. 
The Court asked counsel for ParkWest at the Hearing if the Court could properly 
reconsider its memorandum decision based on new issues raised in ParkWest's motion for 
reconsideration. As our Supreme Court's opinion in the prior appeal in this lawsuit establishes. 
this Court plainly can consider new issues raised by ParkWest in deciding its motion for 
reconsideration. ParkWest Homes LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603. 608,238 P.3d 203. 208 
(2010) (parkWest "argues that after it registered on May 2, 2006, Barnson ratified the contract. 
That issue was not presented to the district court, and so we will not consider it on appeal. ... 
ParkWest could have flied a motion/or reconsideration." (emphasis added»: A court is 
equally allowed to consider new evidence in deciding a motion for reconsideration under 
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472~ 147 PJd 100, 104 (Ct. App. 
I Cf. Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263. 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding, 
prior to the adoption o/I.R. c.P. 11 (a)(2)(BJ, that where a "motion for 'reconsideration' raises 
new issues, or presents new information, not addressed to the court prior to the decision which 
resulted in the judgment, the proper analogy is to a motion for relief from judgment under 
Rule 60(b)."). 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
(I) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND (ii) MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND JUDGMENT· 2 
567 
3/10 
Apr-15-2011 02:50 PM Moffatt Thomas 2083855384 
2006) C'the case law applying Rule 11(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new evidence when a 
motion is brought under the rule .. ," (emphasis in original)).:! 
Furthennore, the law ofIdaho establishes that a district court may enter summary 
judgment for the non~moving party where merited. Thus, as held in Harwood v. Talbert. 136 
Idaho 672, 39 P.3d 612 (2001): 
In this case, partial summary judgment was granted to 
Harwood, the non-moving party. This Court has determined 
"[s]ununary judgment may be rendered for any party, not just the 
moving party, on any or all the causes of action involved, under the 
rule of civil procedure" thus allowing trial courts flexibility in 
detennining the form of relief granted in summary judgment 
orders. 
ld. at 677, 39 P.3d at 617 (brackets in original; citation omitted). 
Accordingly, after reconsidering its memorandum decision, the Court has 
jurisdiction to alter or amend its judgment to provide that Defendant Residential Funding Real 
Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") holds its interest in the property here at issue (the 
"Property") subject to the judgment lien arising out of the recorded judgment entered in 
ParkWest's favor against Defendant Julie Bamson (the "Barnson Judgment"), the fonner owner 
of the Property. 
2 The opinion in Johnson also establishes that a district court can reconsider an 
interlocutory order on which judgment subsequently was entered, provided the motion for 
reconsideration under I.R.C.P. l1(a)(2)(B) is filed prior to entry of the judgment See id at 471, 
147 P.3d at 103 eOn November 2, 2004, Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration .... 
Judgment was entered three days later ... "). Accordingly~ this Court has jurisdiction to alter or 
amend its judgment following reconsideration of its memorandum decision. See id. at n.3 
("Rule 59(e) proceedings afford the trial court the opportunity to correct errors both of fact or 
law that had occurred in its proceedings; it thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action 
short of an appeal."). 
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B. A Trustee Under Il Deed of Trust Can Be Removed by the Beneficiary Under 
Idaho Law for Any Reason at All. 
After counsel for ParkWest submitted at the Hearing the recorded "Appointment 
of Successor Trustee," by which First American Title Insurance Company ("First American") 
succeeded to the position of trustee under the MERS3 deed of trust that First American 
foreclosed by power of sale. the Court asked whether the deed of trust contained a provision 
providing for the appointment of a successor trustee - a question counsel for neither party could 
then answer. In this regard~ although the subject deed of trust happens to contain such a 
provision,4 the provision essentially paraphrases Idaho Code Section 45-1504(2), which provides 
that "the beneficiary may,for any reason obtain the resignation of the trustee" (emphasis added). 
and thereupon nominate and appoint a successor trustee. 
Thus, both MERS' deed of trust and Idaho Code Section 45"1504(2) are entirely 
consistent with the decisions in Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 586~ 671 P .2d 1048, 1049 
(1983) ("We hold that the deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of 
sale ... ~')~ and Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 314 n.2, 824 P.2d 887,889 (Ct. 
App. 1991) ("Under Idaho law, a deed of trust is a mortgage with a power of sale ... "). 
Additionally, and as was pointed out in ParkWest's earlier reply memorandum, Residential has 
cited no authority whatsoever in support of its contention that First American held a property 
right under Idaho law that was subject to due-process protections. 
3 I.e., Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERSH). 
4 See Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Residential Funding Real Estate 
Holdings, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment. filed November 17, 2010, Ex. A at p. 13 of 15, 
~ 24 ("Lender may,for any reason or cause, from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a 
successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder." (emphasis added)). 
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Moreover, the question of whether First American once held a property right 
subject to constitutional protection is immaterial to the just resolution of Park West's pending 
motions for the reasons summarized below. 
C. The Lien of the Barnson Judgment Relates Back to, and Hils Priority From, 
the Date ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien Attached to the Property. 
As argued by ParkWest's counsel at the Hearing, based on the undisputed facts 
and law submitted in support of Park West's pending motions, both motions tum on the 
resolution of one issue: Whether the lien of the Bamson Judgment relates back to, and has 
priority from, the date ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the Property - which was six 
months before MERS recorded its two deeds oftrust.~ Thus. the following issues are not in 
dispute; 
1. ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the Property on May 18,2006, 
when ParkWest commenced work.6 Terra-West, Inc. v.Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, No. 36523,2010 
WL 5186706, at *8 (Idaho Dec. 23. 2010) (a mechanic's "lien attaches at the time that work is 
commenced under a contract ... "). 
5 Although Residential has done its very best to confuse the issues of (i) when the 
Bamson Judgment attached to the Property; and (if) whether, after it attached, the priority of the 
judgment lien related back to, and was established by, the priority ofParkWest's mechanic's 
lien. these two issues are obviously separate questions - with only the second of the two issues 
remaining in dispute. 
6 Memorandum Decision and Order on MER8' Motion for Protective Order, ParkWest's 
Motion to Compel, MERS' Motion to Dismiss. Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Residential's Motion in Limine ("Memorandum Decision"), filed February 16,2011, at 11. 
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2. MERS' two deeds of trust were recorded six months after ParkWest's 
mechanic's lien attached to the Property, on November 14,2006,7 
3. Therefore, the interest Bamson had in the Property when she granted 
MERS' two deeds of trust was encumbered by ParkWest's mechanic's lien, as was the interest in 
the Property conveyed by First American to Residential. Idaho Code Section 45-1506(10) ("The 
trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest in the property which the grantor had, or 
had the power to convey. at the time of the execution by him of the trust deed ... tt). 
4. The Bamson Judgment was recorded by the Canyon County Recorder on 
October 9,2008,8 and attached to the Property upon recording. Idaho Code Section lOw l110 
(from the time ajudgment is recorded by a county recorder, ''the judgment so recorded becomes 
a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not exempt from 
executlon .... , ") 
5. Residential acquired the Property at First American's trustee's sale on 
July 20,2009/ nine months after the Bamson Judgment was recorded. 
6. Therefore, Residential had constructive notice of the Bamson Judgment 
when Residential purchased the Property. Idaho Code Section 55~801 ("Any ... judgment 
affecting title to or possession of real property may be recorded ... It) and Idaho Code Section 
7 Memorandum Decision 11. 
8 Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Defendant Residential Funding Real 
Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment, filed March 23, 2011, at ~ 2 and Ex. A. 
9 Memorandum Decision 11. 
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55-811 ("Every conveyance ... recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the 
recorder for record, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers ... "). 
With respect to the one material issue that remains in dispute - whether the lien of 
the Bamson Judgment rela.tes back tOt and has priority from, the date ParkWest·s mechanic's lien 
attached to the Property - Residential has yet to cite a single case or secondary authority 
supporting its contention the lien does not relate back. Conversely, ParkWest relies on the 
following authorities and secondary authority cited and quoted in its earlier supporting and reply 
memorandums to support its contention the lien does relate back: 
• BNG Mortgage, Inc. 11. Tax Pros, Inc., 46 P.3d 812,818 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2002) ("In general, a judgment lien against real estate relates back to the 
date on which the real estate was attached." (footnote with citations to 
multiple supporting authorities omitted)). 
• J.L Kislak Mortgage Corp. of Delaware v. William Matthews Builder, 
Inc., 287 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972) ("The lien of judgment for 
a mechanic's lien relates back to the time that the contractor commenced 
work or first supplied materia!."). Accord In re Rainbow Trust, Bus. 
Trust, 200 B.R. 785, 789 (Bank!. D. Vt. 1996). aff'd. 216 B.R. 77 (B.A.P. 
2d Cir. 1997). 
• American Jurisprudence 2d: 
A lien securing a debt which becomes merged in ajudgment 
generally is not affected by such merger. If a debt is of such a character 
that a lien is given by common law or statute, the merger of the judgment 
does not involve a merger of the lien and the latter may continue until the 
debt is satisfied. An assignment or lien securing a debt which becomes 
merged in a judgment is not affected by the merger; the merger does not 
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destroy the character of the debt. If a creditor has a lien upon property of 
the debtor and obtains ajudgment against the debtor, the creditor does not 
thereby lose the benefit of the lien. The judgment only changes the form 
of the action for recovery. The creditor retains the right to enforce a lien 
or gain possession of property held as collateral for the debt. The reason 
for this rule is to avoid the obvious injustice of forcing the assignee or lien 
holder to lose its security preference by pursuing its claim to judgment. 
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 462 (2006) (multiple footnotes omitted). 
D. MERS Voluntarily Extinguished Its Interest in the Property by Effecting an 
Elective Trustee's Sale. 
As argued by ParkWest in its reply memorandum and at the Hearing, the Bamson 
Judgment would have had no adverse effect on MERS' liens under its two deeds of trust had 
MERS elected to judicially foreclose its liens, rather than electing to effect a trustee's sale during 
the pendency of this lawsuit. However, as this Court properly held, "once Residential became 
the owner of the property pursuant to the Trustee's Deed, :MERS' interest was extinguished." 
Memorandum Decision 9. Obviously any arguable interest in the Property attributable to First 
American under MERS' two deeds of trust was then also extinguished. 
Accordingly~ although MERS had the absolute right to litigate the amount of 
ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien until MERS elected to effect a trustee's sale - and thereby 
extinguish both its and First American's interests in the Property - :MERS voluntarily elected to 
walk away from this litigation and its challenge to ParkWest's mechanic's lien. The legal effect 
of MERS' decision thus inures as a direct result of MERS' own voluntary election made during 
the course of this lawsuit; and not as a result of anything ParkWest or Defendant Bamson did 
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that would "strip lenders with deeds of trust or mortgages on real property of their legal and 
contractual rights,n as Residential has argued,lo 
DATED this 15th day of April 2011. 
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BA.RRETI, ROCK & 
FlELDS, CHARTERED 
B/~1?-7~. Butfis - Of the Finn 
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Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"), by and 
through its counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully files this 
Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For Reconsideration and 
1\'1otion To Alter Or Amend Judgment (collectively, "Motions"). 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court cOlTectly granted summary judgment in favor of Residential, and ParkWest 
has not provided this Court with any basis in fact or law for reconsidering or altering that 
judgment. Instead, ParkWest's Motions ask this Court to set aside an entire body of case and 
statutory law and invite collusion and fraud by every single property owner in the State of Idaho 
whose property is encumbered by a deed of tmst. It is contrary to due process and the plain 
language of statute for ParkWest to use its stipulated judgment against Bamson to eliminate the 
interests of persons who were never party to the lawsuit and never parties to the stipulated 
judgment. To be clear: ParkWest's lien pursuant to its stipulated judgment against Juli Bamson 
does not relate back to the date its mechanic's lien might have attached because, under 
Idabo Code section 45-510, ParkWest's mechanic's lien expired as to First American long 
before the judgment lien against Barnson was ever entered. 
II. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
The facts and procedural history are set forth in various places in this matter's now 
lengthy record. In summary, the facts releva..,t to these Motions are that: 
1. After filing its mechanic's lien (ParkWest's "Lien") in November 2006, ParkWest 
named as Defendants only the Property owner, Juli Bamson ("Barnson"), and Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems (<iMERS"), the beneficiary of two deeds of tlUst (the "First and 
Second MERS Deeds of Trust") recorded against the Property, ParkWest never named First 
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American Title Insuranee Company ("First American"), the Trustee of the First MERS Deed of 
Trust, who held legal title to the Property. 
2. On or about September 30,2008, ParkWest and Barnson filed a Stipulation For 
Entry Of Default Judgment (the "Stipulation") which pennitted ParkWest to take "immediate 
possession of the Property;" in exchange, Park West agreed to "waive and release[] Barnson from 
any personal liability related to or arising out of ParkWest's improvement of the Property." 
MERS was not a pmty to the Stipulation. First American (who has never been a party to the 
case) and Residential (who was not then a party to the case) were not parties to the Stipulation 
either. Pursuant to the Stipulation, this Court entered the Default Judgment Against Julie G. 
Barnson Only (the "Barnson Judgment") on October 7.2008, which ParkWest then recorded. 
3. On July 9,2009, Homecomings Financial, LLC ("Homecomings"), the lender 
under the First and Second MERS Deeds of Trust, foreclosed on the First MERS Deed of Trust 
and First American conveyed the Property to Residential via Trustee's Deed. 
4. Residential intervened in this case on November 4,2010. 
5. Residential filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pm-suant to Idaho Code section 
45-510, based on ParkWest's failure to name First American as a party defendant, which this 
Court granted on February 16,2011. On March 1,2011, this Court entered Judgment in favor of 
Residential that Residential's interest "is, for all purposes, prior and senior to ParkWest's 
interest. " 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. This Court's Grant of Summary Judgment Was Correctly Granted And Is Founded 
On Deeply-Rooted Idaho Law. 
This Court~om~~gty granted Residential':. Motion for Summary Judgment based on the 
straightfonvard application of Idaho law. Idaho Code section 45-510 provides that a mechanic's 
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lien becomes void six months after it is filed unless "proceedings be commenced in a proper 
court \vithin that time to enforce such lien." There is ample Idaho case law strictly construing 
that six-month deadline. See Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104,298 P.2d 972 (1956) (holding that 
a mechanic's lien is lost as to a property owner not timely named in a suit, even where the 
husband. a co-owner, is named in the lawsuit, because the six month time frame in which to 
foreclose a lien "is more than a mere statute of limitations which is waived if not pleaded~ ... it 
is a limitation ... upon the right or liability itself; and ... the lien is lost as against the interest of 
any person not made a party to an action to enforce it within the six month period"); Palmer v. 
Bradford, 86 Idaho 395, 401,388 P.2d 96 (1963) (holding that if Idaho Code section 45-510 is 
not complied with "no jurisdiction exists in the court to enforce the lien. When the limit fixed by 
statute for duration of the lien is past, no lien exists, any more than if it had never been created"); 
Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 497,501, 185 P. 554 (1919); 
D.W Standrod & Co. v. Utah Implement-Vehicle Co., 223 F. 517,518 (9th Cir. 1915); 
Continental & Commercial Tmst v. Pacific Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915); and 
Utah Imp lemen t- Vehicle Co. v. Bowman, 209 F. 942, 947-48 (D. Idaho 1913). See also 
Weyyakin Ranch Property Oi1'11ers' An'n, Inc. v. City of Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1,2-3,896 P.2d 
327, 328-29 (1995) (holding that the trial cOlUi never obtained jurisdiction over elected city 
officials where the plaintiffs "failed to name the elected officials individually")~ and Collier 
Carbon & Chemical Corp. v. Castle Butte, Inc., 109 Idaho 708, 710, 710 P.2d 618,620 (Ct. App. 
1985) (holding that the trial court "lacked jurisdiction initially to enter ... judgment" against 
persons \vho were not named as defendants in their individual capacity in the complaint). 
Because under Idaho Code sections 45-1202 and 45-1513 a deed of trust is a conveyance 
of legal title to tJle tmstee of the deed of trust. the failure to na.me the trustee as a pmty defendant 
is fatal to a lien claimant's foreclosure action This is the universally recognized rule of law. See 
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52 AM. JUR. 2D Mechanics' Liens § 369 (2010). See also Heyward & Lee Constntction Co., 
Inc., v, Sands, Anderson, It1arks, & Miller, 249 Va. 54, 58,453 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1995); Walt 
Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986); Riley v. Peters, 194 
CaJ.App.2d 296, 15 Cal.Rptr. 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Lunsford v. Wren, 64 W.Va. 458, 63 S.E. 
308,311 (1908); Johnson v. Bennett, 6 Colo.App. 362, 367,40 P. 847, 849 (CL App. 1895); 
Schillinger Fire-ProofCemem & Asphalt Co. v. Arnott, 14 N.Y.S. 326, 329 (N.Y. Spec. Term 
1891); and Columbia Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Taylor, 25 1l1.App. 429 (1887). 
Finally, Bonner Building Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 
682 P.2d 635 (Cl. App. 1984) stands for the rule that the interest of an unnamed party in property 
is "unaffected by" a mechanic's lien foreclosure, and such mechanic's lien is "lost ... against the 
property in regard to" unnamed parties. 
By application of this extensive body of law, this Court correctly found that ParkWest's 
failure to name First American was fatal to ParkWest's Lien as against First American and 
ResidentiaL ParkWest's mechanic's Lien was recorded November 28, 2006. Idaho Code section 
45-510 required ParkWest to name First American as a Defendant by May 28, 2007, or the Lien 
would expire as to First American. This lawsuit was not commenced until August 7,2007. 1 
First American was ~ named as a Defendant. When the Bamson Judgment was stipulated to 
and entered in October 7,2008, ParkWest's mechanic's Lien had long since expired as a matter 
of law as against First American and this Court had no jurisdiction to enforce the Lien as to 
! Bamson filed bankruptcy on April 13. 2007, approximately four and one-half months after ParkWest recorded its 
Mechanic's Lien. Under II US.c. I08(e), ParkWest's time to foreclose its Lien was extended until 30 days after 
termination of the stay. P'arkWest obtaim:d relief from &tay on July 21,2007. ParkWesttben commenced this 
action on August 7, 2007. Even if the Court finds that Bamson's bankruptcy to!Jed tbe time for commencing a 
foreclosure action agair;st First American, the six months would have expired, at the latest. on August 20,2007, 
30 days after ParkWest obtained relief from stay. The 45-510 period (and therefore. ParkWest's mechanic's Lien 
as to First American) had certainly expired by February 7, 2008, six months after ParkWest commenced this 
lawsuit, which was eight months before ParkWest recorded the Barnson Judgment. 
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ParkWest. When First American exercised its power of sale under the First MERS Deed of 
Tmst it conveyed the Propelty to Residential free and clear of ParkWest's Lien. 
B. Parl{West's Interest In The Property Pursuant To The Barnson Judgment 'Vas 
Never Senior To First American's Interest, And 'Vas Eliminated By The Trustee's 
Sale To Residential, 
As set forth in Residential's Opposition to ParkWest's Motions, the Bamson Judgment cmmot 
eliminate the interests of MERS., First American, or Residential in the Property. Idaho Code 
section 10-1110 provides that a judgment lien attaches "from the time of such recording, and 
not before" (emphasis added). The Bamson Judgment was recorded October 9,2008, nearly two 
years after the First and Second MERS Deeds of Trust. By the plain language of Idaho Code 
section 10-1110, "ParkWest's Judgment Lien" cannot relate back to when ParkWest allegedly 
started work on the Property and is not prior to the MERS Deeds of Trust. 
Idaho's recording laws also reject ParkWest's position. Idaho Code section 55-606. 
Judgment liens, like otller conveyances (under Idaho Code section 45-1513, a deed of tmst is 
expressly defined as a "conveyance of real property"), have priority only as of the date they are 
recorded. A judgment lien is eliminated as to particular property by the foreclosure of a 
previously-recorded, i.e., senior, mortgage or deed of trust. Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight, 
92 Idaho 210, 440 P.2d 143 (1968). ParkWest's (Bamson) Judgment Lien was therefore 
eliminated by the foreclosure of the First MERS Deed of Trust and First American's July 2009 
conveyance of the Property to Residential by Trustee's Deed. 
Another problem with ParkWest's argument is that the Bmnson Judgment does not say 
that the Bamson Judgment lien relates back to the priority date of ParkWest's mechanic's Lien. 
Because the Bamson Judgment was the product of a stipulation between ParkWest and Bamson 
only, the Bamson Judgment could do no more than grant "ParkWest .. ,judgment against 
Bamson to the extent of her interest in the Property." Bamson Judgment, p. 2. The Bamson 
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Judgment could not and did not declare the rank of each lien in the Property (see Idaho Code 
section 45-512). The face of the Bamson Judgment is clear: ParkWest took only such title as 
Barmon then had, which interest was subject to the First and Second MERS Deeds of Trust. 
Title 45, Chapter 15 of the Idaho Code is dedicated to the principal that trustees of deeds 
of trust hold legal title to propelty (see particularly sections 45-1502 and 45-1513). Moreover, 
the face of the First MERS Deed of Trust makes clear that "Borrower irrevocably grants and 
conveys to Trustee, in trust, '"vith power of sale, the [Property]." Affidavit Of Ryan T. 
McFarland In Support Of Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion For 
Summary Judgment, filed November 17,2010, Em. A, p. 3. That interest could not be 
foreclosed by a stipulated judgment that First American, as trustee of the First MERS Deed of 
Tmst was not party to, in a lawsuit that First American was not party to. 
If Park West were permitted to eliminate a trustee's legal interest in property merely by 
stipulating to ajudgment with a property owner, property owners generally would be at libelty to 
collude with any purpOlted mechanic's lien claimant to strip lenders with deeds of trust or 
ffi0l1gages on real property of their legal and contractual rights. A property owner who no longer 
des ires her land to be burdened with an encumbrance could collude with a purported (even 
fictitious) mechanic's lien claimant, the lien claimant could file suit without naming anyone 
other than the property owner, stipulate to a judgment with that property owner, and then use that 
judgment to strip the lender of its interest in the property. That technique could be used by 
anyone - even an abjectly fraudulent cLaim could strip a lender of its rights. This is the very 
result that the body of case law relied on by the Comt in reaching its judgment in this case is 
designed to avoid. It is precisely what the Idaho Court of Appeals was guarding against when it 
held" in Bonner Building Supply, Inc., that: 
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Bonner Building Supply, Inc., 682 P.2d at 639. Due process protects against exactly the kind of 
thing ParkWest urges for now. ParkWest's argument should be rejected. 
C. The Doctrine Of Merger Does Not Allow Park"Vest To Trump First American's 
And Residential's Interest In The Property_ 
To the extent ParkWest is asserting that its (Bamson) Judgment lien and mechanic's Lien 
"merged," such argument is self-defeating. Under the doctrine of merger, a lien holder's prior 
lien is extinguished once the lien holder obtains title to the property. Estate of Skvorak v. 
Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16,20,89 P.3d 856,860 (2004) (holding that where a 
mortgagee obtained title to property via a quit claim deed, "merger would extinguish the 
mortgage and such a result would not be in [the mortgagee's] interest"). If in fact ParkWest's 
mechanic's Len merged with the Bamson Judgment lien, then ParkWest's mechanic's Lien was 
extinguished and this case is even easier for the Court to resolve. 
D. The First NlERS Deed Of TrlLst Gives Homecomings The Right To Appoint A 
Successor Trustee. 
The fact that Homecomings recorded an Appointment Of Successor Trustee making First 
American the Trustee of the First MERS Deed of Trust is irrelevant to the law that a mechanic's 
lien claimant cannot foreclose the trustee of a deed of tnISt'S interest without making the trustee a 
party to the case. The face of the First MERS Deed of Trust provides that "Lender may, for any 
reason or cause, from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a successor trustee to any Trustee 
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appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to 
all the title, power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law." Affidavit 
Of Ryan T. McFarland In SUppOlt Of Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings. LLC's Motion 
For Summary Judgment. filed November 17,2010, Exh. A, p. 13, par. 24. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, MERS requests that this Court deny ParkWest's Motions 
For Reconsideration and To Alter Or Amend Judgment. 
k'L.~Yi 
DATED THIS 1'0 day of April, 2011. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
~ .;~ /' 
By I I 
Ry T. 
Att s for DefendantiCountercIaimant 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC 
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CANYON COUNTY CUlAK 
T. CRAWFOAD. OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
) 
P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho ) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JULIE BARNSON, MORTGAGE ) 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION ) 
SYSTEMS, INC, ) 
) 
Defendants, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ) 
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware ) 
Limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Intervenor. ) 
--------------------------) 
Case No. CV-2007-8274 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING PARKWEST'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION -
AND MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
Procedural History 
On February 16, 2011, this court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on a 
number of pending motions, including Defendant Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On February 23, 2011, ParkWest filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On March 1, 2011, this 
court entered a Judgment which, among other relief, dismissed ParkWest's claims against MERS 
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and Residential. On March 4, 2011, ParkWest filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. 
ParkWest's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment was filed on March 7, 2011. On March 23, 2011, Residential filed its 
memorandum in opposition to those motions and on March 28, 2011, ParkWest filed a Reply 
memorandum. 
Oral argument was held on March 30, 2011. Robert Bums appeared on behalf of 
ParkWest and Ryan McFarland appeared on behalf ofMERS and Residential. The court allowed 
the parties the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs and those briefs were filed on April 15, 
2011. 
Standard of Review 
IRCP II(a)(2)(B) allows a party to seek reconsideration of an interlocutory order prior to 
the entry of a final judgment, or within fourteen (14) days of entry of the final judgment. The 
decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is squarely within the court's discretion. 
Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007). When faced with such a decision the 
court is directed to consider any new facts presented by the moving party that provide insight 
into the correctness of the order to be reconsidered. Id, citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First 
Natl. Bank, 118 Idaho 812,823,800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). It is the burden of the party 
seeking reconsideration to place those new facts before the court for reconsideration. While a 
party may properly present new evidence on an IRCP U(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration, 
that rule does not require new evidence and the lack of new evidence alone does not act as an 
automatic denial of the motion for reconsideration but a trial court acts within the bounds of its 
discretion in denying a motion for reconsideration when a moving party either fails to provide 
new evidence or fails to direct the court to evidence already in the record that would raise a 
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genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 
2006). This court incorporates herein its findings as set forth in the Memorandum Decision 
previously issued on these issues. The court notes that ParkWest timely filed its Motion for 
Reconsideration prior to the entry of the Judgment in this case. 
The standard for a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to IRCP 59(e) varies 
from the standard applicable to a motion for reconsideration. When considering a motion to alter 
or amend a judgment, the court cannot consider new evidence. P HH Mortg. Services Corp. v. 
Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 200 P.3d 1180 (2009). The decision to alter or amend a judgment 
pursuant to IRCP 59( e) is left to the discretion of the court and such a motion offers the court an 
opportunity to correct errors or fact and/or law as a mechanism to correct the record prior to or in 
lieu of an appeal. Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303 (2008). See also Coeur 
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First National Bank o/North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990). 
ParkWest does not present new evidence in support of its arguments, but raises an issue not 
previously briefed or addressed by the parties. Since ParkWest timely filed its Motion for 
Reconsideration prior to entry of the summary judgment and its Motion to Alter or Amend after 
the entry of the summary jUdgment, the court will consider both motions applying the 
appropriate applicable standards. 
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
ParkWest asks the court to reconsider its order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Residential pursuant to IRCP II(a)(2)(B). ParkWest also asks the court to alter or amend the 
judgment upon reconsideration of its order granting summary judgment in favor of Residential 
pursuant to IRCP 59(e). In support of its motion to alter or amend the judgment, ParkWest relies 
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on the same legal authority, facts and arguments set forth in support of its motion for 
reconsideration. ParkWest cites to First National Bank of Lewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P. 
287 (1900) and Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) in support of its 
argument. 
In this memorandum decision, the court refers to the Default Judgment Against Julie 
Barnson Only filed October 7, 2008 as the "Bamson Judgment" in order to distinguish it from 
the judgment entered by this court pursuant to its grant of Residential's motion for summary 
judgment. Park West's argument is premised on the heretofore unaddressed legal significance of 
the recorded Bamson Judgment as considered within the context of the factual and legal record 
that is the basis of the court's February 16,2011 memorandum decision. ParkWest contends that 
the recording of the Bamson Judgment prior to the trustee's transfer of the property at issue to 
Residential by Trustee Deed vitiated the transfer or at the very least made it subordinate to the 
Bamson Judgment lien. In asserting this argument, ParkWest does not appear to challenge the 
court's previous ruling regarding the effect of ParkWest's failure to timely file suit against the 
designated trustee of record in its effort to enforce its mechanic's lien. In its supporting 
memorandum ParkWest concedes that neither party has previously addressed the effect of the 
Bamson Judgment on the Residential's summary judgment motion. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Support of (i) Motion for Reconsideration and (ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, page 2). 
Therefore, ParkWest now requests relief from the courts summary judgment decision on the 
basis that Residential's interest in the property is subject to the judgment lien established when 
ParkWest obtained and recorded the Bamson Judgment. Residential, objects to ParkWest's 
pending motions, and argues that the Summary Judgment entered by the court correctly resolves 
the issues submitted to the court. 
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The court fmds that the issue raised by Park West in the pending motions was not 
previously addressed by either of the parties' in their briefing and arguments on Residential's 
motion for summary judgment. The issue was asserted in ParkWest's Supplemental Amended 
Complaint filed on September 14,2010. Therefore, the court will consider the issue raised in 
Park West's pending motions to determine whether it should reconsider its previous decision. 
The court's consideration of ParkWest's pending motions is limited to the narrow issue of the 
legal effect of recording the Barnson Judgment relative to prioritizing the parties' respective 
interests in the property. The court is not otherwise revisiting its findings of fact and legal 
conclusions as contained in its memorandum decision. 
Relation Back Theory 
The first prong of ParkWest's argument is that when First American Title Insurance 
Company conveyed the property to Residential by Trustee's Deed on July 9, 2009, the 
conveyance was made subject to the Barnson Judgment lien. ParkWest asserts that the priority 
date of the Barnson Judgment lien relates back to March 18, 2006 when Park West commenced 
its work on the property because the mechanic's claim of lien which was the precursor to this 
lawsuit (and the Barnson Judgment) attached as ofthat date. 
The court finds that on October 7,2008, a Default Judgment Against Julie Barnson Only 
was filed in this case. The Barnson Judgment was a result of a stipulation between ParkWest 
and Barnson, and provided that ParkWest was entitled to the following: 
2. ParkWest shall have judgment against Barnson to the extent of her interest in 
the Property, but not personally, for the following amounts as pled in the SAC!: 
I The SAC is the Second Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien filed on October 6, 2008. 
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$141,208.39 for the amount owed to ParkWest as of November 28, 2006, with 
respect to its construction of improvements to the Property ... 
Default Judgment Against Julie Barnson Only, filed October 7, 2008, ~2. 
The Bamson Judgment was recorded October 9, 2008 as Instrument No. 2008054565 in 
the records of Canyon County, Idaho. (Affidavit of Ryan McFarland, Exhibit A, filed on March 
23,2011). 
A judgment lien is a creature of statute, and as such the respective rights of the parties 
must be determined by the applicable statute. Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 382 P.2d 913 
(1963). In this case, ParkWest obtained a judgment against Barnson and recorded it with the 
Canyon County Recorder. Thus, the Barnson Judgment became a judgment lien pursuant to 
Idaho Code 10-1110 which states "from the time of such recording, and not before, the judgment 
so recorded becomes a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not 
exempt from execution, owned by him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time prior to the 
expiration of the lien." I.e. 10-111 0 (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute states 
that the judgment lien is created at the time the judgment is recorded. 
ParkWest relies on a number of cases from other jurisdictions to support this position. 
The court has carefully reviewed those cases and it finds that they are not applicable or 
persuasive to the facts of this case. For example, ParkWest cites to us. v. Security Trust & Sav. 
Bank of San Diego, 340 U.S. 47, 71 S. Ct. 111 (1950) in support of its claim that the doctrine of 
"relation back" should apply in this case. In that case, the United States Supreme Court was 
asked to determine whether a United States tax lien had priority over an attachment lien when the 
tax lien was filed subsequent to the date of the attachment lien but prior to the date the judgment 
on the attachment lien was recorded. This court notes that the United States Supreme Court was 
dealing with an attachment lien in that case which is not the factual situation in this case. 
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Further, the United States Supreme Court did not apply the "relation back" doctrine, finding 
instead that the asserted relation back would not apply because the attachment lien had not been 
reduced to judgment at the time that the tax liens were recorded, thus the attachment lien was not 
given priority. This court reads the Us. v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank of San Diego case as 
supporting a literal, plain language interpretation of I.e. 10-1110 that unless and until a judgment 
is recorded, there is no judgment lien. 
Similarly, the court does not find the other cases cited by ParkWest to be of assistance to 
this court in addressing this issue because the cases are factually distinguishable from this case. 
None of the cited cases involve a judgment lien arising out of a mechanic's lien. The cited cases 
primarily involve the law of attachment and attachment liens which is not the issue presented in 
this case. In Idaho, attachment and writs of attachment are governed by Idaho Code 8-501 et 
seq, a separate title than the judgment lien provision of Idaho 10-1110. Finally, to the extent that 
the cited cases actually address and apply the "relation back" principle, they primarily do so 
because the specific statutory provisions of the named jurisdictions provide for it. 
Park West has not cited any authority from the State of Idaho in which the "relation back" 
doctrine has been applied to a factual scenario similar to the record of this case. ParkWest has 
not demonstrated to this court why it should disregard the specific language of Idaho Code 10-
1110 that specifically provides that the date the judgment recorded pursuant to that section is the 
effective date for establishing lien priority. 
In support of its relation back theory, ParkWest has also cited the recent Idaho case 
Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, _ 247 P.3d 620, 627 (2010) in 
which the Idaho Supreme Court stated "a mechanic's lien, 'if any exists at all, relates back to the 
date of the commencement of the work or improvement or the commencement to furnish the 
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material. '" Id, citing White v. Constitution Min. & Mill. Co., 56 Idaho 403, 55 P.2d 152 (1936). 
This court does not take issue with the Terra-West decision. However, as this court has 
previously ruled, any mechanic's lien asserted by ParkWest was invalid against the designated 
Trustee under the Deed of Trust at issue in this case because ParkWest failed to timely name the 
designated trustee as a defendant in its mechanics lien foreclosure suit. The Trustee 
subsequently conveyed the property to Residential unencumbered by ParkWest's mechanic's 
lien. 
The court does not find the "relation back" theory advanced by ParkWest is applicable to 
the specific facts of this case and as noted above, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, has 
determined that the authority cited by ParkWest from other jurisdictions is neither binding, nor 
persuasive to the court in its consideration of this issue. The provisions of Idaho Code 10-1110 
clearly provide that the Bamson Judgment was effective as a judgment lien on October 9,2008, 
the date it was recorded. 
Constructive Notice Theory 
ParkWest also argues that Residential acquired the property, pursuant to the Trustee's 
Deed, subject to ParkWest's judgment lien because it had constructive notice of the judgment 
lien at the time the property was transferred to Residential pursuant to the Trustee Deed. In 
support of this argument, ParkWest cites to Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 
(1983). Residential disputes the applicability of the Long case to the facts of this case. 
In considering this argument, the court first reviews the relevant history of this case. The 
court finds that on November 14,2006, the Deed of Trust was recorded with the Canyon County 
Recorder as Instrument No. 200690998. That document provides that Julie Bamson was the 
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borrower, Homecomings was the lender, MERS was the beneficiary of the security interest and 
that Transnation was the trustee. The document also details that the "Borrower irrevocably 
grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, the power of sale," and that "Borrower understands and 
agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interest granted by Borrower .... but, if necessary 
... MERS has the right: to foreclose and sell the Property." As is typical of Deeds of Trust, the 
document puts the Borrower on notice of the consequences of default, including forfeiture and 
sale of the property. Finally, the document provides that the Lender may appoint a successor 
trustee. 
As alleged in the Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien filed on August 7, 2007, 
ParkWest filed a Claim of Lien on November 28, 2006. The Complaint also alleges that on 
April 13, 2007, Barnson filed bankruptcy and ParkWest was granted relief to seek foreclosure of 
its lien rights. 
On June 28, 2007, an Appointment of Successor Trustee was recorded with the Canyon 
County Recorder as Instrument No. 2007044840 appointing First American Title Insurance 
Company as trustee of the November 14, 2006 Deed of Trust. 
As noted above, the Barnson Judgment was recorded on October 9, 2008. On July 20, 
2009, a Trustee's Deed was recorded with the Canyon County Recorder as Instrument No. 
2009036841. That Trustee's Deed states that after Barnson's default on the Deed of Trust, and 
all notice and statutory requirements were complied with that the property was sold at a 
Trustee's Sale on July 9, 2009. 
ParkWest argues that the Long case stands for the proposition that a trustee's interest in 
property under a deed of trust is subject to divestiture as a result of subsequent legal proceedings 
involving the grantor of the deed of trust. That is that Barnson's stipulation re: the Barnson 
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judgment was an intervening event that limited First American's interests as the trustee. In 
addition, Park West argues that Long establishes that a grantor of a deed of trust retains all 
ownership attributes other than the power of sale retained by the trustee and that as such the only 
interests that Residential acquired in the property were those held by Bamson, and therefore such 
interest is limited by entry of the Bamson Judgment. This court, however, does not read the 
Long decision in the same manner as ParkWest. What ParkWest fails to recognize in its reliance 
on Long is the nature of the various transactions between the parties in that case and the impact 
on the parties of the applicable bankruptcy statutes. The Long court stated: 
At the time Williams filed his petition in bankruptcy, he had a legal 
interest in the property which was good against all person except the Lewis 
County Abstract Company, which held nothing more than the power of sale upon 
the happening of certain contingencies. Williams' interest (comprised of all other 
attributes of ownership) passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. Section 541 of Title 
11 U.S.C. provides: 
"Property of the estate. (a) The commencement ofa case under section 301,302, 
or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following 
property, wherever located: (1) ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case." 
The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed all legal and equitable interests of 
Williams in the subject property to A vco. A vco's interest as beneficiary under the 
Deed of Trust merged with this purchased interest. Thus, A vco was the o\vner of 
the property and entitled to possession subject only to the satisfaction of the 
homestead interest of Williams and to Long's inferior judgment lien. 
Consequently, when Lewis County Abstract executed the Deed of Reconveyance, 
it conveyed no interest. 
Long subsequently purchased the property from A vco and stands III 
A vco's position. 
Long, 105 Idaho at 588, 671 P.2d at 1051. 
As the above cited analysis shows, once the bankruptcy trustee obtained all interests in 
the property, it was able to convey the entirety of the interests in the property back to A vco and 
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A vco was thereafter in the position to convey the property to Long, the judgment lien holder. 
The court does not find that the facts of Long are commensurate with the facts of this case. The 
Long decision is based on the unique nature of the transaction involved and effect of the 
bankruptcy statutes on the respective interests of the parties in that case. 
The court is also guided by the following relevant Idaho Code sections regarding deeds of 
trusts, trustee's sales and priority of interests: 
4S-1S03.TRANSFERS IN TRUST TO SECURE OBLIGATION --
FORECLOSURE. 
(1) Transfers in trust of any estate in real property as defined in section 45-
1502(5), Idaho Code, may hereafter be made to secure the performance of an 
obligation of the grantor or any other person named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
Where any transfer in trust of any estate in real property is hereafter made to 
secure the performance of such an obligation, a power of sale is hereby conferred 
upon the trustee to be exercised after a breach of the obligation for which such 
transfer is security, and a deed of trust executed in conformity with this act may 
be foreclosed by advertisement and sale in the manner hereinafter provided, or, at 
the option of beneficiary, by foreclosure as provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property. 
4S-1S06.MANNER OF FORECLOSURE -- NOTICE -- SALE. 
(10) The trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest in the property 
which the grantor had, or had the power to convey, at the time of the execution by 
him of the trust deed together with any interest the grantor or his successors in 
interest acquired after the execution of such trust deed. 
4S-1S07.PROCEEDS OF SALE -- DISPOSITION. 
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale as follows: 
(1) To the expenses of the sale, including a reasonable charge by the 
trustee and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(2) To the obligation secured by the trust deed. 
(3) To any persons having recorded liens subsequent to the interest of the 
trustee in the trust deed as their interests may appear. 
(4) The surplus, if any, to the grantor of the trust deed or to his successor 
in interest entitled to such surplus. 
4S-1S0S.FINALITY OF SALE. 
A sale made by a trustee under this act shall foreclose and terminate all interest in 
the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom notice is given 
under section 45-1506, Idaho Code, and of any other person claiming by, through 
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or under such persons and such persons shall have no right to redeem the property 
from the purchaser at the trustee's sale. 
In reviewing both the record of this case along with the relevant statutory authority cited 
above the court comes to the following conclusions. Bamson executed the Deed of Trust 
conveying to the Trustee, Transnation, the power to appoint a successor trustee which 
Transnation did when it appointed First American. The Deed of Trust also gives the Trustee the 
power, upon certain contingencies, such as default (as was the case with Bamson) to initiate a 
foreclosure action and sell the property pursuant to a Trustee's Sale in accordance with Idaho 
law. First American did so upon Bamson's default. Nothing in the record indicates that this is 
disputed or that the sale was not valid. In addition, the court finds nothing in the record to 
indicate that First American, at any time, gave up any of its rights pursuant to the Trust Deed. 
Also instructive to the court are the following Idaho Code sections: 
Idaho Code 55-606.Conclusiveness of conveyance -- Bona fide purchasers. 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive against the 
grantor, also against everyone subsequently claiming under him, except a 
purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, 
acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly 
recorded. 
Idaho Code 55-811.Record as notice. 
Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified, 
and recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for 
record, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and 
mortgage e )es. 
Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified, 
and recorded as prescribed by law, and which is executed by one who thereafter 
acquires an interest in said real property by a conveyance which is constructive 
notice as aforesaid, is, from the time such latter conveyance is filed with the 
recorder for record, constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent 
purchasers and mortgagees. 
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The court finds that I.e. 55-606 protects the interests of Residential because when 
Bamson executed the Deed of Trust and it was recorded, the Deed of Trust became the first 
encumbrance on the property. At the time of the Trustee's Sale, First American was the grantor 
of the property, having obtained the status and ability to sell due to Barnson's default. As such, 
when the property was then conveyed from First American to Residential, Residential's interest 
was superior to all claims that arose subsequent to the recordation of the Deed of Trust. See 
Estate ofSkvorak v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16,89 P.3d 856 (2004). Pursuant to 
I.C. 45-1506, both Bamson and ParkWest retained certain rights of redemption following the 
Trustee's Sale and neither chose to exercise those options. 
Similarly, the court finds that because the Deed of Trust was recorded prior to the lien 
foreclosure lawsuit filed by Parkwest, Parkwest was on notice of the named Trustee's interest in 
the property. ParkWest never named the designated trustee as a defendant in its mechanic's lien 
foreclosure lawsuit within the prescribed period allowed to perfect the lien under the law. 
Therefore, the asserted lien fails as against any interest assigned to the designated trustee. 
Thereafter, when ParkWest recorded the Bamson Judgment, ParkWest was on notice, pursuant 
to I.C. 55-811 that its judgment lien would be secondary Gunior) to the Deed of Trust. 
ParkWest's arguments belie the fact that Bamson's Judgment lien never had priority over the 
Deed of Trust and the interests held in that trust by the Trustee as a result of Bamson's default. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, ParkWest's February 23, 2011 Motion for 
Reconsideration of Order on Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment and March 4, 2011 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment are denied. In making this decision the court reaffirms its 
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February 16, 2011 order granting summary judgment in favor of Residential. In making this 
decision, the court has considered the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits offered 
in support and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and finds that there still are no 
genuine issues of material fact and that Residential is entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
oflaw to the extent previously ordered. 
~ ~ 
Dated this\ q da~y.-::..0Jf ~7'--I--"--' 20 JJ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on ~ day of June 2011, s/he served a true and correct copy of 
the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the manner described: 
• upon counsel for plaintiff, 
Robert B. Burns 
Moffatt, Thomas Barrett, Rock and Fields, Chartered 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
• upon counsel for defendants 
Ryan T. McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis, and Hawley, LLP 
877 West Main St., Ste. 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
• upon counsel for Julie Bamson 
David E. Wishney 
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0837 
and/or when slhe deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient 
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
Chris Yamamoto, Clerk of the Court 
By: __ ~--,--I _____ _ 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT AND ITS ATTORNEYS STEPHEN C. 
HARDESTY AND RYAN T. MCFARLAND, OF THE FIRM HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, 877 W. MAIN STREET, SUITE 1000, P.O. BOX 1617, 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-1617, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED 
COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, ParkWest Homes LLC, appeals against the above-
named respondent, Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, to the Idaho Supreme Court 
from the final judgment entered in the above-entitled action on March 1,2011, by the Hon. 
Bradly S. Ford, presiding. 
2. The appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment 
described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to, Rules 11(a)(1) and 14(a), 
I.AR. 
3. The preliminary issues on appeal are: 
( a) Did the district court err in ruling that the lis pendens and judgment the 
appellant recorded against the real property at issue (the "Property") did not provide the 
respondent with constructive notice of this civil action and the appellant's lien in the Propeliy7 
(b) Did the district court err in ruling that the priority date of the appellant's 
claimed mechanic's lien in the Property was lost when the district court reduced the appellant's 
claimed lien to a finaljudgrnent against the owner of the Property? 
(c) Did the district court err in ruling that the "law of the case" doctrine does 
not preclude the respondent from litigating new challenges to the validity of the appellant's lien 
in the Property, which the supreme court held to be valid in the prior appeal in this civil action 
(Supreme Court Docket No. 36246-2009)7 
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( d) Did the district court err in ruling that the respondent acquired the 
Property free of the appellant's lien, because the trustee under the deed of trust who deeded the 
Property to the respondent was not named as a party defendant in this civil action? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record in this action. 
5. No reporter's transcript is requested. 
6. In lieu of the standard record, the appellant requests only the following documents 
be included in the clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, LA.R.: 
(a) Register of actions; 
(b) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed October 2,2008; 
(c) Default Judgment Against Julie G. Barnson Only, filed October 7,2008; 
(d) Affidavit of David Zawadzki, filed November 10, 2008; 
(e) Judgment, filed January 26,2009; 
(f) Remittitur (Supreme Court Docket No. 36246-2009), filed July 22, 2010; 
(g) Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien, filed September 14, 
2010; 
(h) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 's Answer to Plaintiff's 
Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien, filed October 7,2010; 
(i) Stipulation to Intervene, filed November 4,2010; 
(j) Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention, filed November 15,2010; 
(k) Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed November 17,2010; 
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(1) Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Residential Funding Real 
Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 17,2010; 
(m) Answer to Counterclaim in Intervention, filed November 30, 2010; 
(n) Memorandum in Opposition to Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, 
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 27,2010; 
(0) Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine, filed January 5, 2011; 
(p) Memorandum Decision and Order on MERS' Motion for Protective 
Order, ParkWest's Motion to Compel, MERS' Motion to Dismiss, Residential's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and Residential's Motion in Limine, filed February 16,2011; 
(q) Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Residential's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Notice of Hearing, filed February 23,2011; 
(r) Judgment, filed March 1,2011; 
(s) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment; Notice of Hearing, filed March 4, 
2011; 
(t) Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support of (i) Motion for Reconsideration and 
(ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed March 7, 2011; 
(u) Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Defendant Residential 
Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed March 23,2011; 
(v) Plaintiffs Reply in Support of (i) Motion for Reconsideration and 
(ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed March 28,2011; 
(w) Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of (i) Motion for 
Reconsideration and (ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed April 15, 2011; 
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(x) Memorandum Decision and Order Denying ParkWest' s Motion for 
Reconsideration - and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed June 14,2011; 
(y) This Notice of Appeal; and 
(z) Table of contents and index. 
7. I certify: 
(a) nla; 
(b) nla; 
(c) that the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid; 
(d) that the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
( e) that service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, LAR. 
DATED this 20th day of June 2011. 
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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
RECORD 
050000047.24407321 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, ROBERT B. 
BURNS OF THE FIRM MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS, 
CHARTERED, 101 S. CAPITOL BLVD., 10TH FLOOR, P.O. BOX 829, BOISE, 
IDAHO 83701, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding 
hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's 
record in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal: 
1. N/A 
2. Clerk's Record: 
(a) Original Verified Complaint To Foreclose Lien, filed August 7,2007; 
(b) First Amended Verified Complaint To Foreclose Lien, filed September 12, 
2007; 
(c) Stipulation For Entry Of Default Judgment, filed September 29,2008; 
(d) Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland In Support Of Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment, filed October 2,2008; 
(e) Memorandum In Support Of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc. 's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed October 2,2008; 
(f) Second Amended Complaint To Foreclose Lien, filed October 6,2008; 
(g) Reply To Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. 's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 17,2008; 
(h) Memorandum Decision On Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. 's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed January 6,2009; 
(i) Notice of Appeal, filed March 9, 2009; 
(j) 2010 Opinion No. 68 (Supreme Court Docket No. 36246-2009), filed June 
25,2010; 
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(k) Order On Stipulation To Intervene, filed November 10, 2010; 
(1) Affidavit Of Ryan T. McFarland In Support Of Motion To Dismiss 
MERS, filed November 12,2010; 
(m) Affidavit Of Ryan T. McFarland In Support Of Motion For Protective 
Order, filed November 12,2010; 
(n) Memorandum In Support Of Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, 
LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 17,2010; 
(0) Affidavit Of Ryan T. McFarland In Support Of Opposition To Motion To 
Compel, filed December 2,2010; 
(p) Reply Memorandum In Support Of Residential Funding Real Estate 
Holdings, LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed January 5, 2011; 
(q) Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion In Limine, filed January 12, 
2011; 
(r) Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition 
To Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration And Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment, filed 
March 23, 2011; 
(s) Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's 
Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration And 
Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment, filed Apri115, 2011. 
3. N/A 
4. N/A 
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5. I certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served upon the 
clerk of the district court or administrative agency and upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. ~ 
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HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC aka 
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORL, 
INC., 
Defendants, 
and 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) -
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JUN 2 9 2011 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T RANDALL, DEPUTY 
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38919-2011 
Canyon County Docket No. 2007-8274 
A Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed May 18, 2009, in appeal No. 
36246, Parkwest Homes v. Bamson; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be 
AUGMENTED to include the Court File, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior 
appeal No. 36246. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a 
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the 
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included 
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 36246. The LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD shall be 
filed with this Court after settlement. 
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DATED this 2.2!:day of June 2011. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
For the Supreme Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
P ARKWEST HOMES, LLC., eta!., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Case No. CV-07-08274*C 
-vs-
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
JULIE G. BARNS ON, etal., 
Defendants, 
And 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS, LLC., etal., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Intervenor-Respondent. 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
exhibits were sent: 
NONE 
IN THE WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _-'--_ day of Sf(li: ,2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
; 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
In the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNfY OF CANYON 
PARKWEST HOMES, LLC., eta!., ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Case No. CV-07-08274*C 
-vs-
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
JULIE G. BARNSON, eta!., 
Defendants, 
And 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS, LLC., eta!., 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court ofthe Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Limited Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Limited Record of the pleadings and documents 
as requested, however, no duplicate documents were included from prior appeal No. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---;:~'-- day 
'--::..&:...fJ"'-'--'---' 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
III the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PARKWEST HOMES LLC., etal., ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Supreme Court No. 38919-2011 
-vs- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
JULIE G. BARNSON, etal., 
Defendants, 
And 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL 
ESTATE HOLDING, LLC., etal., 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record to the attorney of record to each party as follows: 
Robert B. Burns, MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD. 
Stephen C. Hardesty, Ryan T. McFarland, Jake D. McGrady, 
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
c:: the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this --'-"-'-_ day of----',,"-)""-·~.....,.f'+r-'--; _,2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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